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INTRODUCTION
Theory and Politics in Marxism-Leninism.
Theory and Politics in Marxism-Leninism.
Politics is the creature of conflict. It is the mechanism by 
which conflict about public policy is resolved. It is about 
decision and choice, it operates through competition and 
compromise based on the relative priority of different 
interests. Thus, the essence of political decision lies in 
the process by which interests are apportioned a relative 
worth and priority.
Conflict may arise between interests which are broadly 
sympathetic, as well as between those which are antithetical, 
because all political interests derive from different social 
goals and political values. It is these goals and values - 
political doctrines - which determine the priority attached 
to a political interest by any particular group. They establish 
the criteria which define political benefit and political 
disadvantage. Thus, politics may be described as a mechanism of 
choice, competitive in form, but philosophical in substance.
The science of politics explains the process of competition, the 
art of politics provides the reason for competition.
This sub-thesis is about the process of political change in 
the international Communist movement. It is based on the 
contention that Marxist-Leninist organizations are primarily 
motivated by philosophical interests, but that these interests 
are pursued through the process of power political 
competition. The history of world Communism can only be 
explained in terms of the dynamic relationship Marxism- 
Leninism creates between theoretical and political interests.
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T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  p h i l o s o p h y  p r o v i d e s  t h e  
b a s i s  f o r  C o m m u n i s t  p o l i c y  f o r m a t i o n .  I t  i s  p r i o r  t o  a n d  
d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  p o l i c y  r e s p o n s e  t o  o u t s i d e  p o w e r  p o l i t i c a l  
e v e n t s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  a n d  
t h e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  
b a s e d  o n  m e c h a n i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p e t i t i o n .  T h u s ,  n e i t h e r  a  
p u r e l y  d o c t r i n a l  n o r  a  p u r e l y  p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  c a n  p r o p e r l y  
e x p l a i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  m o v e m e n t .  T h e  p r e s e n t  t a s k  i s  
t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  b y  w h i c h  d o c t r i n a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s  i n t e r a c t  t o  p r o d u c e  a c t i o n  i n  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  
o r  g a n i z a t i o n s .
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t u d y  c a n n o t  d o c u m e n t  t h e  v a s t  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o v e m e n t .  I t  w i l l  p r o c e e d  b y  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m a j o r  d o c t r i n a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  h i s t o r i c a l  s t a g e s  t h r o u g h  
w h i c h  t h e  m o v e m e n t  h a s  p a s s e d .  T h i s  w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  d e t a i l e d  
d o c t r i n a l  s t u d i e s  o f  L e n i n i s m  a n d  S t a l i n i s m ;  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  
t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e  w i l l  p r o v i d e  a  c a s e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p o l i t i c s  a n d  d o c t r i n e ;  a n d ,  f i n a l l y ,  e a c h  
o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  w i l l  b e  p l a c e d  w i t h i n  t h e  b a s i c  h i s t o r i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  a s  a  l a r g e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  m o v e m e n t .
I t  i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t h e  d o c t r i n a l  b a s e s  o f  L e n i n i s m  a n d  
S t a l i n i s m  c a n n o t  b e  d i v o r c e d  f r o m  t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  a n d  
p o l i t i c a l  b a c k g r o u n d .  No r  c a n  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a  p u r e l y  p o l i t i c a l  p h e n o m e n o n .  T h i s  w o u l d  d e n y  t h e
b a s i c  c o n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  s u b - t h e s i s .  T h e  r e s t r i c t e d  n a t u r e  o f
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the proposed structure of analysis is dictated by the 
requirements of space. The categories of analysis are not 
absolute, they merely establish the emphasis of each section. 
Each chapter will consider the essential doctrinal and 
political structure of its subject era.
The basic doctrinal contention of the present work is that 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy contains theoretical interests of 
two distinct types.
The first relate to theoretical and ideological discipline. 
Leninist class analysis teaches that the proletariat is unable 
to develop a socialist consciousness under the conditions of 
capitalism. This supposed proletarian naivete leaves 
socialist ideology extremely vulnerable to subversion by 
reformist bourgeois ideology such as trade unionism. It is, 
therefore, important to maintain socialist consciousness 
through strict doctrinal discipline. This philosophical need 
is reinforced by the organizational requirement for absolute 
discipline within all revolutionary organizations.
Against this demand for doctrinal orthodoxy is the Leninist 
recognition that political action and historical change 
inevitably alter the basis of theoretical speculation. This 
process is central to Marxism-Leninism and dialectical 
materialism. It demands that objective conditions determine 
theoretical and ideological approach. These conditions 
constantly change over time and place. Thus, some process of
. 5 .
doctrinal development and diversification is essential to the 
attainment of Communism. The dilemma of Communist leadership 
is to distinguish between genuine theoretical development - 
based on new objective conditions - and revisionist attempts 
to subvert socialist consciousness.
The historical contention of the sub-thesis flows from this 
doctrinal structure of Marxism-Leninism. It will be argued 
that the history of world Communism can be divided into two 
separate eras distinguished by the ascendancy of the different 
Leninist values of discipline and diversity.
During the inter-war period world Communism was dominated by 
the Stalinist Comintern. The revisionism of Stalin made the 
survival of the Soviet state a pre-requisite for the final 
victory of socialism. It was a policy which emphasized the 
disciplinary impulse of Leninism to the exclusion of doctrinal 
diversity. The analysis will concentrate on demonstrating 
that Stalinism was indeed a revision of Leninism, but one 
which could nevertheless be justified as reasonable given the 
contemporary vulnerability of both the USSR and the 
international movement.
The next period began after the Second World War with the 
advent of independent Communist Parties materially able, and 
politically willing, to reject Soviet hegemony and to apply 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine creatively to their own objective 
conditions. But despite the latent doctrinal tensions
. 6 .
i n v o l v e d  i n  S t a l i n ’ s d e n i a l  o f  l o c a l  o b j e c t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e  
p r e s t i g e  a n d  p o w e r  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  m a n a g e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  
f o r m  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s c i p l i n e  u n t i l  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  
S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e .
T h e  d i s p u t e  a p p e a r s  a s  a  w a t e r s h e d  w h i c h  f i n a l l y  b r o k e  S o v i e t
h e g e m o n y ,  e n a b l i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  i d e o l o g i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t
a l o n g  t h e  l i n e s  p r e d i c t e d  b y  L e n i n .  I t  h a d  b e e n  L e n i n ’ s
b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  r e v o l u t i o n ,  b y  p r o d u c i n g  a
c o l l e c t i v e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  g o v e r n i n g  C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s ,  w o u l d
l e a d  t o  d o c t r i n a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  W h i l e  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t
s e v e r a l  C o m m u n i s t  g o v e r n m e n t s  w o u l d  q u i c k l y  c o me  i n t o  b e i n g
wa s  p r o v e d  w r o n g ,  h e  wa s  u l t i m a t e l y  p r o v e d  r i g h t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t
t h a t  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  S o v i e t  d o c t r i n a l  h e g e m o n y  wa s  d e s t r o y e d  b y
t h e  a d v e n t  o f  o t h e r  g o v e r n i n g  p a r t i e s .  I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e
n o t e d  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e  p r o v i d e d  t h e  c a t a l y s t
f o r  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  S o v i e t  h e g e m o n y ,  i t  h a d  b e e n  u n d e r
p r e s s u r e  s i n c e  t h e  s p l i t  w i t h  Y u g o s l a v i a .  I n d e e d ,  e v e n  t h e
a b o r t i v e  H u n g a r i a n  R e v o l u t i o n  wa s  i t s e l f  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e
d o c t r i n a l  d i v e r s i t y  r e l e a s e d  b y  g o v e r n i n g  p a r t i e s .  I n  t h e
e v e n t ,  t h e  d i s p u t e  f r a c t u r e d  t h e  m i n d l e s s  d o c t r i n a l  c e n t r a l i s m
o f  t h e  S t a l i n i s t  e r a ,  a n d  b r o u g h t  c l o s e r  t h a t  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t
i d e a l  e l o q u e n t l y  d e s c r i b e d  b y  T r o t s k y  w h e n  h e  w r o t e  t h a t  ’’T h e
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  i d e o l o g i c a l  m a t u r i t y  o f  t h e
c o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  h a s  i t s  own i n t e r n a l  r h y t h m ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e i r
1
own e x p e r i e n c e s ” .
1.  L e o n  T r o t s k y .  T h e  T h i r d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f t e r  L e n i n . (New 
Y o r k :  P a t h f i n d e r  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 0 )  p .  2 3 8 .
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This sub-thesis is not a general history of international 
Communism. It is concerned with structures and specific 
causal processes which can be used to sustain a contention 
about the process of change in Marxist-Leninist organizations.
The first section will deal with the doctrines of Leninism and 
Stalinism. These chapters will concentrate on the process of 
doctrinal analysis in Marxist-Leninist political cultures.
The first chapter will establish the imperatives of Leninist 
doctrine, the second will provide a case study of doctrinal 
change. The next section will consider the Sino-Soviet 
dispute as an example of the way doctrinal and political 
interests interact to produce Communist policy. These 
chapters will consider doctrinal issues in the context of 
political events rather than Marxist-Leninist legitimacy.
The final section will seek to demonstrate the historical 
validity of the overall argument suggested by each of these 
case studies. It will establish certain miscellaneous 
historical facts necessary to support the framework of the 
overall analysis.
The study of political philosophy involves the analysis of 
complex ideas and requires the use of specific terminology.
It follows that the sense of any political analysis depends 
upon the early and explicit definition of these terms. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to provide explicit definitions of the 
major ideas to be considered throughout the analysis.
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I n  t h e  s t u d y  o f  C o m m u n i s t  p o l i t i c s  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t e r m s  s u c h  a s
d o c t r i n e ,  t h e o r y  a n d  i d e o l o g y  a n d  a r e  i n  common u s a g e .  T h e s e
a r e  n o t  u s u a l l y  i n t e r - c h a n g e a b l e  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  a c c o r d e d
s p e c i f i c  m e a n i n g s .  Y e t  p h i l o s o p h y  i t s e l f  c a n n o t  b e
2
u n c o n t r o v e r s i a 1 1 y d e f i n e d  i n  a n y  s i n g l e  f o r m u l a .  I t  i s  u s e d :
t o  c o v e r  a  w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n d e r t a k i n g s  a l l  
o f  w h i c h  c o m b i n e  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  w i t h  m o r e  o r  
l e s s  e x c l u s i v e  r e l i a n c e  o n  r e a s o n i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  
o b s e r v a t i o n  o r  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  c l a i m s .  3
T h u s ,  a t  o n e  l e v e l  p h i l o s o p h y  c a n  b e  u s e d  a s  a  b r o a d
c o l l e c t i v e  t e r m  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l
u n d e r t a k i n g s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  g e n e r a l  u s e  o f  t h e  t e r m
p h i l o s o p h y ,  i t  i s  g i v e n  o t h e r  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  m e a n i n g s  i n  t h e
v a r i o u s  t r a d i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  m o d e r n  a c a d e m i c  d i s c i p l i n e  o f
g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h y .  I n  e t h i c s ,  t h e  f i e l d  o f  g e n e r a l
p h i l o s o p h y  m o s t  r e l a t e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  " a  p h i l o s o p h y * 1
4
i s  d e e m e d  t o  b e  **a s e t  o r  s y s t e m  o f  u l t i m a t e  v a l u e s * * .  T h e
t e r m  t h e o r y ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  c a n  b e  h e l d  t o  me a n  **a s e t  o f
b e l i e f s ,  c o n s c i o u s l y  h e l d  a n d  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d ,  t h a t  p u r p o r t s
t o  s e t  f o r t h  a n d  e l u c i d a t e  a  d e f i n i t i v e  b u t  l i m i t e d  s y s t e m  o f  
5
v a l u e s * * .  And i d e o l o g y  c a n  b e  h e l d  t o  m e a n  a  s e t  o f  a t t i t u d e s  
c o n d i t i o n e d  b y  t h e o r y  i n  e a c h  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  a n d  p l a c e .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  v i e w ,  i d e o l o g y  i s  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h e o r y ,  i t  
r e p r e s e n t s  s p e c i f i c  p r o g r a m m e s  o f  a c t i o n  d e s i g n e d  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  g o a l s .
2 .  A l a n  B u l l o c k  a n d  O l i v e r  S t a l l y b r a s s  ( E d s ) .  T h e  F o n t a n a  
D i c t i o n a r y  o f  M o d e r n  T h o u g h t . ( L o n d o n :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1 9 7 7 ) ,  p .  4 7 0 .
3 .  I b i d .
4 .  I b i d .
5 .  P e t e r  M a y e r .  C o h e s i o n  a n d  C o n f l i c t  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o m m u n i s m . ( T h e  H a g u e :  M a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f ,  1 9 6 8 )  p .  2 4 .
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T h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  w i l l  b e  u s e d  i n  t h i s  s u b - t h e s i s .  I n  t h e
f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  p h i l o s o p h y  w i l l  b e  u s e d  a s  a  s i m p l e  c o l l e c t i v e
t e r m .  B u t  i t  w i l l  a l s o  b e  u s e d  i n  t h e  e t h i c a l  s e n s e  o f  a  s e t
o r  s y s t e m  o f  u l t i m a t e  w h e n  c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f
t h e o r y  a s  a  d e f i n i t i v e  b u t  l i m i t e d  s y s t e m  o f  v a l u e s  a n d
i d e o l o g y  a s  a  s e t  o f  a t t i t u d e s  c o n d i t i o n e d  b y  t h e o r y  i n  e a c h
p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  a n d  p l a c e .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  c o n f u s i o n  o v e r
t h e  t e r m  p h i l o s o p h y ,  t h e  w o r d  d o c t r i n e  w i l l  b e  u s e d  a s  a
c o l l e c t i v e  t e r m  f o r  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c a l ,
t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  i d e o l o g i c a l  t e l e thons  i n  w h i c h  p h i l o s o p h y  w i l l  b e
t a k e n  a s  p r i o r  t o  t h e o r y  a n d  t h e o r y  a s  p r i o r  t o  i d e o l o g y .  I t
s h o u l d  b e  e m p h a s i z e d  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  s u b - t h e s i s  i s
p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  a s  t h e o r y  -  a
d e f i n i t i v e  b u t  l i m i t e d  s y s t e m  o f  v a l u e s  -  a n d  t h a t  p h i l o s o p h y
w i l l  u s u a l l y  b e  u s e d  a s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  t e r m .  I t  i s ,
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i m p o r t a n t  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e s e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
6
d i s  t i n e t i o n s .
T h i s  s u b - t h e s i s  i s  b a s e d  o n  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  p h i l o s o p h y  
a n d  p o l i t i c s  w h i c h  i s  b o t h  a r b i t a r y  a n d  p r o b l e m a t i c .  I t  i s ,  
a f t e r  a l l ,  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h i e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  
d o c t r i n e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i e s  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  i d e o l o g i e s .  T h e  
t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  b e  u s e d  i n  t h r e e  w a y s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e
6 .  T h e r e  h a s  b e e n  m u c h  d e b a t e  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  M a r x i s m ,  
w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  L e n i n i s m ,  i s  p h i l o s o p h y  a s  s u c h ,  c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  a l l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  c a n  b e  r e s o l v e d  b y  a p p l y i n g  
t h e  H e g e l i a n  d e r i v e d  d i a l e c t i c .  Ma r x  h i m s e l f  a p p e a r s  t o  
w a v e r  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e  e a r l y  Ma r x  o f  t h e  G r u n d r i s s e  
h a v i n g  a p p a r e n t l y  b e e n  m o r e  o f  a  p h i l o s o p h e r  a n d  t h e  l a t e r  
Ma r x  o f  K a p i t a l  m o r e  o f  a n  e c o n o m i s t .  T h e  a v o w e d  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  c h a n g i n g  t h e  w o r l d  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  d i r e c t i o n ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  m e r e l y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i t ,  i n t r o d u c e s  m o r e  " p o l i t i c s "  
t h a n  s o m e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  m i g h t  c o n s i d e r  p r o p e r .
. 10 .
sub-thesis. First, it will be used in a general way to denote
the governmental and social context of the ideas under
consideration. Secondly, it will be used to denote the
particular values of power politics - the politics of
expediency wherein the interests which motivate behaviour are
based on the acquisition and conservation of wealth, power or
status by individuals, groups or nations, largely irrespective
of other ethical or philosophical values. Finally, it will be
used to describe the mechanism by which much political action
takes place, what W.B. Gallie called ”po1iticking...a whole
congeries of social processes - of competitive claims, of
mutual criticism and complaint, of bargaining, debating,
7
converting, squaring and fixing.” These definitions are not 
given as definitive, but are established merely to distinguish 
the process of real-world politics from the aims of Marxist- 
Leninist political activists. They should not be taken to 
mean that Marxism-Leninism is itself un-political or innocent 
to expediency, nor to limit politics to one competitive system 
of conflict resolution, nor to denigrate that mechanism as 
only or necessarily opportunistic.
The term objective conditions relates to Marxist social 
analysis. These conditions identify the historicalv
imperatives and class relationships by which Marxists
characterize different societies. Political interests arise
concerning the interpretation of these conditions. The term
dialectical materialism refers to the logical system utilized
7. W.B. Gallie. nAn Ambiguity in the Idea of Politics and Its 
Practical Implications”, in Political Studies. Vol. XXI,
No. 4, p. 442.
by Marx, Engels and Lenin, which was ultimately derived from 
Hegel. It is premised on the notion that reality is 
characterized by change, inter-relationships, and 
contradictions, and that progress proceeds through the Triad 
of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis. It is the basis of Marxist-
Leninist historical and social analysis.
The terms Marxist-Leninist, Leninist, Bolshevik and Communist, 
will be taken to mean that tradition of political philosophy 
conceived by Karl Marx, developed by Friedrich Engels, and 
finally modified by V.I. Lenin. The changing nature and 
definition of Communist theory and ideology is, of course, the 
basic subject of the sub-thesis. At this point, it is only 
necessary to note that Marxism-Leninism will be taken to mean 
that tradition of political philosophy and political 
organization approved by Lenin. It is Lenin’s imprimatur 
which will be taken as the yard-stick for establishing the 
Marxist-Leninist validity of any political idea.
Those organizations which declare nominal allegiance to the 
philosophy and practice of Marxism-Leninism are variously 
referred to as Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik, Communist and 
fraternal organizations, agencies, bodies or parties. They 
are collectively referred to as the international Communist 
movement, world Communism, international Communism or the 
Communist and Workers’ Parties. The factious realignments 
which took place among these organizations after the Second 
World War are dealt with as they arise and the above 
collective nomenclature is retained throughout the analysis.
PART ONE
THE THEORY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ACTION
CHAPTER I
The  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  S t r u c t u r e  o f  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m .
The Philosophical Structure of Marxism-Leninism
Unlike many political organizations, Marxist-Leninist 
agencies claim to be inspired by a comprehensive set of 
theoretical ideas. Indeed, Lenin unequivocally stated that 
theory should play a causal role in the formulation of 
Communist policy:
Without revolutionary theory there can be no 
revolutionary movement...the role of vanguard fighter 
can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the 
most advanced theory. 1
This concern with theory is only natural in a movement whose 
sole purpose is to establish a political system based on a 
particular theoretical interpretation of human history. Thus, 
international Communism is not simply concerned with the 
attainment of political power, but with the transformation of 
the international political system into a better, 
theoretically conceived, Communist society. In order, 
therefore, to understand the history of the Communist 
movement it is essential to understand the internal logic of 
the political theory by which it is inspired.
The theoretical basis of Marxism-Leninism lies in the social
and economic theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and
the political and organizational theories of Lenin. The
internal logic of Marxism-Leninism - the ultimate guide to
understanding Communist action - can be traced directly to
these theoretical roots. This chapter will consider the
nature and historical significance of the relationship between
2
theory and action in Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
1. V.I. Lenin. What Is To Be Done? (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1977) pp. 38-39.
2. The unity of theory and practice is an associated Marxist
concept which is considered below, see: pp. 20-23, 82-84.
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The importance of political theory as a guide to Marxist- 
Leninist action is a consistent theme in all Communist 
literature. And the present challenge is not to prove this 
accepted phenomenon, but to identify how this theory serves to 
direct Marxist-Leninist thought and policy processes.
The single most important consequence of the primacy of theory
in Marxist-Leninist politics is the demand it apparently
creates for theoretical and ideological orthodoxy. Indeed,
this issue has dominated the history of the international
Communist movement. As early as 1902, Lenin called for unity
of Party doctrine, adding:
’unimportant’ error may lead to most deplorable 
consequences, and only short-sighted people can consider 
factional disputes and a strict differentiation between 
shades of opinion inopportune or superfluous. The fate of 
the Russian Socia 1-Democracy for very many years to come 
may depend on the strength of one or the other ’shade’. 3
In the first instance, theoretical and ideological diversity
tends to have a deleterious impact on Party discipline. It
invites doctrinal conflict and encourages factionalism which
greatly reduces the operational effectiveness of any
revolutionary organization.
But, while the authoritarian approach adumbrated by Lenin in
1902 may well have made a revolutionary organization more
effective, its perpetuation into the practices of governing
parties and the readiness with which it could be exploited for
4
power-po1itica 1 purposes were to have appalling results.
3. Lenin, op.cit., p. 38.
4. See, Chapter II, pp. 32-46, below.
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T h e  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  t h e  p r i m a c y  o f  t h e o r y  w i t h i n  M a r x i s m -  
L e n i n i s m ,  w h a t e v e r  i t s  i d e a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t e n d s  t o  c r e a t e  a  
d e m a n d  f o r  c o n f o r m i t y .  T h u s ,  i t  w i l l  b e  a r g u e d  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h i s  s u b - t h e s i s  t h a t  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  i s  i n t r i n s i c  t o  
M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m ,  a n d  n o t  m e r e l y  a  t e m p o r a r y  p o w e r - p o 1 i t i c a  1 
n e c e s s i t y  c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  a  p e r m a n e n c e  b y  S t a l i n .
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h a t  M a r x i s m -
L e n i n i s m  i s  a  v a r i a n t  o f  M a r x i s m ,  i t s e l f  a  t r a d i t i o n  o f
5
o f  t h o u g h t  o p e n  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  I n  h i s  p a p e r  " O u r
R e v o l u t i o n " ,  L e n i n  h i g h l i g h t e d  h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f  M a r x i s m .  He a t t a c k e d  " a l l  o u r  p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s  d e m o c r a t s
a n d . . . h e r o e s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l . . . " :
T h e y  c a l l  t h e m s e l v e s  M a r x i s t s ,  b u t  t h e i r  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  
M a r x i s m  i s  i m p o s s i b l y  p e d a n t i c .  T h e y  h a v e  c o m p l e t e l y  
f a i l e d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h a t  i s  d e c i s i v e  i n  M a r x i s m ,  n a m e l y ,  
i t s  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  d i a l e c t i c s .  T h e y  h a v e  e v e n  a b s o l u t e l y  
f a i l e d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  M a r x ’ s p l a i n  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  i n  
t i m e s  o f  r e v o l u t i o n  t h e  u t m o s t  f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  d e m a n d e d .  6
T h e  r e s p e c t i v e  a p p r o a c h e s  o f  L e n i n  a n d  t h e s e  " i m p o s s i b l y
p e d a n t i c "  M a r x i s t s  t o  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  i n e v i t a b i l i t y
a n d  t h e  l a w s  o f  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f
s o c i a l i s t  r e v o l u t i o n  i l l u m i n a t e s  L e n i n ’ s " f l e x i b l e "  a p p r o a c h
t o  M a r x i s m .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  L e n i n  a r g u e d  t h a t :
w h i l e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  w o r l d  h i s t o r y  a s  a  w h o l e  f o l l o w s  
g e n e r a l  l a w s  i t  i s  b y  n o  m e a n s  p r e c l u d e d ,  b u t ,  o n  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  p r e s u m e d ,  t h a t  c e r t a i n  p e r i o d s  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  
may d i s p l a y  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  f o r m  o r  t h e  
s e q u e n c e  o f  t h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t .  7
5 .  F o r  d e t a i l e d  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  M a r x i s t  t r a d i t i o n  s e e :
G . A .  C o h e n .  K a r l  M a r x ’ s T h e o r y  o f  H i s t o r y :  A D e f e n c e . 
( O x f o r d :  C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 7 ) .
6 .  V . l .  L e n i n .  " O u r  R e v o l u t i o n . "  i n  L e n i n :  C o l l e c t e d  W o r k s . 
V o l u m e  3 3 .  A u g u s t  1 9 2 1 - M a r c h  1 9 2 3 .  ( L o n d o n :  L a w r e n c e  a n d  
W i s h a r t ,  1 9 6 6 )  p p .  4 7 6 .
7 .  I b i d . ,  p .  4 7 8 .
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T h e  M a r x i s t  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  L e n i n  s i m p l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  " T h e
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i v e  f o r c e s  o f  R u s s i a  h a s  n o t
8
a t t a i n e d  t h e  l e v e l  t h a t  m a k e s  s o c i a l i s m  p o s s i b l e . ” T h e
L e n i n i s t  t r a d i t i o n ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  a c c e p t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
u s i n g  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  a i d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l i s m .
I f  a  d e f i n i t e  l e v e l  o f  c u l t u r e  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
b u i l d i n g  o f  s o c i a l i s m  ( a l t h o u g h  n o b o d y  c a n  s a y  j u s t  w h a t  
t h a t  d e f i n i t e  " l e v e l  o f  c u l t u r e ” i s ,  f o r  i t  d i f f e r s  i n  
e v e r y  W e s t - E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r y ) ,  why  c a n n o t  we b e g i n  b y  
f i r s t  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  t h a t  d e f i n i t e  l e v e l  
o f  c u l t u r e  i n  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  w a y ,  a n d  t h e n ,  w i t h  t h e  a i d  
o f  t h e  w o r k e r s *  a n d  p e a s a n t s *  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  
s y s t e m ,  p r o c e e d  t o  o v e r t a k e  t h e  o t h e r  n a t i o n s ?  9
T h i s  e m p h a s i s  o n  h u m a n  a g e n c y  i s  a n  i n n o v a t i o n  w h i c h  s e p a r a t e s  
M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  f r o m  t h e  M a r x i s t  t r a d i t i o n ,  a n d  p l a c e s  t h e  
p a r t y  a n d  i t s  l e a d e r s h i p  a t  t h e  c o r e  o f  L e n i n i s t  s t r a t e g y .  
T h u s ,  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  b e c o m e s  n e u t e r e d  
i n  L e n i n i s t  t e l e o l o g y .  I t  wa s  a c c e p t e d  b y  L e n i n  a s  
f u n d a m e n t a l  t o  M a r x i s t  t h o u g h t ,  b u t  y e t  p l a y s  n o  r o l e  i n  
L e n i n i s t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p o l i c y .  I t  may  c o n f i r m  t h e  r e c t i t u d e  
o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  m o v e m e n t ,  b u t  i t  o f f e r s  n o  g u i d e  t o  
a c t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  s a y s  n o t h i n g  a b o u t  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s  o r  
t h e  t i m e - s c a l e  o f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  " h i s t o r i c a l l y  i n e v i t a b l e ” 
v i c t o r y ,  a n d  v e r y  l i t t l e  a b o u t  how i t  w i l l  b e  a c h i e v e d .  I t  
c a n  b e  t a k e n  t o  e n c o u r a g e  v o l u n t a r i s m  -  " g i v i n g  h i s t o r y  a 
p u s h ” -  o r  i n e r t i a  -  " t i m e  i s  o n  o u r  s i d e " .  I t  g i v e s  n o  
g u i d a n c e  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  w e i g h t s  t o  b e  a t t a c h e d  t o  
a l l e g e d l y  u n i v e r s a l  l a w s  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  t h e  f a c t s  o f  a  
s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  o r  t o  t h e  r o l e s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s  v e r s u s  t h o s e  o f  i m p e r s o n a l  s o c i a l  f o r c e s .  I n  a n
8 .  I b i d .
9 .  I b i d . t p .  4 7 8 - 4 7 9 .
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avowedly atheistic system of belief it plays the same 
teleological role as faith does in religion.
Nevertheless, by implKwkj reinforcing the role of the party 
leadership, this Leninist interpretation of historical 
inevitability does act to reinforce the demand for doctrinal 
orthodoxy, thereby further strengthening the authoritarian 
tendencies within Marxism-Leninism.
The differences between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism are also 
profoundly evident in Lenin’s interpretation of Marxist class 
struggle. This interpretation contends that the exigencies of 
class struggle deprive the proletariat of the intellectual 
resources necessary to develop socialist consciousness. On 
this matter, Lenin quotes extensively from the early work of 
Kar 1 Kautsky:
Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the 
basis of profound scientific know 1edge... The vehicle of 
science is not the proletariat, but the bourgeois 
inte11igentsia:...Thus, socialist consciousness is 
something introduced into the proletarian class struggle 
from without and not something that arose within it 
spontaneously. 10
The full implications of this situation are only revealed by
the meaning of the term socialist consciousness. Both Lenin
and Kautsky described it as an awareness and reasoned
disapproval of the social, political and, above all, economic
system of capitalism. Socialist consciousness implies an
understanding of the class struggle in modern society and the
11
role of the state as an organized political force. It
10. Karl Kautsky. Neue Zeit. 1901-02. XX. I. No. 3, p. 79. 
Cited in Lenin, op.cit.. p. 59.
11. Lenin, Ibid., p. 83.
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requires commitment to the destruction of capitalism, and the
abolition of "the social system that compels the propertyless
12
to sell themselves to the rich”.
Thus, the bourgeoisie must provide the intellectual means for
its own destruction and the proletariat is unable to conceive
the means of its own liberation. This philosophical
deprivation of the proletariat makes socialism extremely
vulnerable to bourgeois influence. Without an indigenous
socialist consciousness, the proletariat is unaware that its
future prosperity depends on the destruction of capitalism.
Socialism is not secured by any inate class consciousness. It
is, therefore, susceptible to reformist bourgeois ideology,
such as trade unionism, which serves to entrench existing
class structures. It is, of course, uncontroversia1 to assert
that this analysis of the class struggle is entirely different
13
to that propounded by Karl Marx.
This situation means that, from the Leninist position, the 
political spectrum is polarized. Socialism is vulnerable to 
bourgeois ideology because its class beneficiaries are 
intellectually deprived - it has no class guardian. The 
unique and vulnerable nature of socialist consciousness means 
that the slightest deviation from basic socialist doctrine 
destroys the only possible socialist influence in society. 
Thus, the only important political distinction is that between 
socialist and non-socia 1ist. By diverting the revolutionary
12. Ibid.
13. See, Cohen, op.cit.
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movement from the precarious path of socialism, deviation
actively aids bourgeois control.
Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology 
formulated by the working masses themselves in the 
process of their movement, the only choice is - either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle 
course (for mankind has not created a "third” ideology, 
and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms 
there can never be a non-class or an above-class 
ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in 
any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree, 
means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. 14
This philosophical situation is fundamental to the nature of
Marxism-Leninism. From it flows the whole framework of
Communist phenomenology. It is immediately important for
providing the philosophical basis for the Communist
movement’s emphasis upon theoretical and ideological
uniformity. But it also provides the basis for vanguard
ideology, and the associated principles of Party discipline
and the dictatorship of the Party. Indeed, it is only
against this theoretical framework that much of
Lenin's work becomes truly meaningful:
Repudiation of the Party principle and of Party 
discip1ine...is tantamount to completely disarming the 
proletariat in the interests of the bourgeoisie... IB
Thus, fundamental characteristics of Marxist philosophy
apparently require that Marxism-Leninism demand absolute
theoretical orthodoxy. But revolutionary theory is only part
of the revolutionary process - it must be applied to the
objective conditions of the host society. This brings us to
the next stage in the internal logic of Marxism-Leninism: the
interaction of political theory and political action.
14. Lenin, op.cit., pp. 59-60.
15. V.I. Lenin. 'Left-wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968). p. 27.
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In the Leninist conception, socialism is a scientific truth
which, like the law of gravity or thermodynamics, is applied
with different results in different situations, but remains
constant as a set of objective principles. Indeed, the
Marxist achievement was in:
putting socialism on a scientific basis and of 
demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from 
the point of view of the materialistic conception 
of history. 16
The work of Lenin is littered with references to the need to
apply scientific socialist theory to the different objective
conditions in different societies.
As long as national and state distinctions exist among 
people and countr i es. . .the unity of the international 
tactics of the communist working-class movement... 
demands, not the elimination of variety or the 
suppression of national distinctions...but an application 
of the fundamental principles of communism. 17
But Marxist philosophy does not treat theory and action as
separate philosophical categories: "The essence of
dialectic is the living unity of understanding an actual
18
situation while we are grappling with it". Indeed, Marx
saw political, legal and moral theories as mere epiphenomena
established and united by the imperatives of economic 
19
relations - the ultimate cause of historical change. Thus, 
unlike the laws of physics, Marxist political theory is not 
immune to environmental conditions. As Lenin himself agreed:
16. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? op.cit.. p. 15.
17. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit.. p. 75.
18. John Lewis. The Marxism of Marx. (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1972) p. 123.
19. T.B. Bottomore & Maximilien Rubel. Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986) p. 45.
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One cannot be a revolutionary Socia 1-Democrat, without 
participating, in the measure of one’s powers, in 
developing and applying...[revolutionary] theory. 20
But this would seem to contradict the very notion of 
theoretical and ideological orthodoxy. If ”to turn aside from 
[socialist ideology] in the slightest degree, means to 
strengthen bourgeois ideology”, then surely the application 
and subsequent development of revolutionary theory necessarily 
constitutes revisionism. Is Lenin correct to demand 
theoretical orthodoxy, or to demand theoretical application?
This dilemma turns on the dynamism of the relationship between 
political theory and political action. If political theory is 
inevitably altered by the process of application, then 
theoretical orthodoxy is not only inappropriate to Marxism- 
Leninism, but has no meaning in terms of Marxist philosophy. 
This issue is important because it has dominated the history 
of international Communism. In a movement which seeks to act 
only on the basis of established doctrine, this is a matter of 
the greatest operational, as well as philosophical importance.
It is a truism of political philosophy that all political 
actions influence the political environment. It is also true 
that rational political action is based on an assessment of 
the political environment. Thus, past political actions 
influence future political decisions.
20. V.I. Lenin. ”The Voice of an Honest French Socialist.” in 
Collected Works, op.cit., Volume 21. August 1914- 
December 1915. p. 354.
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Further, political action requires that a choice be made
between the often antithetical requirements of long-term goals
and short-term political survival. These conditions of
political behaviour mean that all political organizations are
forced to compromise in the face of divergent interests.
Lenin recognized this situation when he stated:
The conclusion is clear: to reject compromises ’on
principle’, to reject the permissibility of compromise in 
general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which 
it is difficult even to consider seriously. 21
But political compromise, like all political action, acts
upon and alters the nature of the political environment.
When political action is motivated by a particular
theoretical interpretation of the political environment, this
situation must call forth a constant reassessment of
theoretical perceptions. In his analysis of change in
Marxist-Leninist states, Peter Mayer summarized this process:
Two antithetical modes of procedure were created by the 
rift between long-range goals and the exigencies of 
day-to-day decision-making, splitting the very 
foundations of the political structure. Thus,the 
political decision-making process acted upon the 
theoretical formulations and prescriptions on which the 
society was purportedly structured. When the leaders 
deemed the time propitious to implement earlier theories, 
intervening and contrary actions had made attainment of 
the original desiderata impossible. In any event, the 
implementation of previous policies was instrumental in 
effecting change in their total political environment. 22
The ultimate result of the dynamic relationship between
theory and action in Marxist-Leninist political culture is
that ”no ’thesis’ can ever be the same after its effects and
23
causes have been studied, described and analysed”. It
.* »21. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit22. Mayer, op.cit.. p. 2.
23. Ibid.
p. 21.
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follows that the application of Marxist-Leninist political 
theory to different societies can be expected to result in 
distinct political cultures which may or may not be similar or 
accord with any single, ’orthodox* notion of Marxism-Leninism.
It is obvious that the demand for absolute theoretical and 
ideological orthodoxy cannot be reconciled with the 
imperatives of Marxist, or general, political philosophy. But 
Lenin does not demand absolute orthodoxy, nor does all 
political action cause fundamenta1 change to political theory. 
The process of theoretical development outlined by Mayer does 
not necessarily contradict Lenin’s stated position on 
theoretical and ideological discipline.
In The State and Revolution, Lenin argued that while the
fundamental aim of Communism was not negotiable, neither was
it dogmatically pre-determined.
On the basis of what data can the question of the 
future development of future Communism be raised?
On the basis of the fact that it has its origin 
in capitalism, that it develops historically from 
capitalism, that it is the result of the action of a 
social force to which capitalism has given birth. There 
is no trace of an attempt on Marx’s part to conjure up a 
Utopia, to make idle guesses about what cannot be known. 
Marx treats the question of communism in the same way as 
a naturalist would treat the question of the development 
of, say, a new biological species, once he knew that such 
and such was its origin, and such and such the direction 
in which it was changing. 24
This is why Lenin endorsed Marx’s comment that "Our theory is
25
not a dogma, but a guide to action”. The nature of the
24. V.I. Lenin. The State and Revolution. (Melbourne: 
International Book Shop, n.d.) p. 64.
25. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit., p. 54.
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Communist polity was never fully elucidated by Marx, Engels or 
Lenin. It could not be, because its nature was dependent on 
future dialectical development.
The demand for theoretical and ideological discipline was not
intended to secure a stagnant doctrine. This would defy the
very essence of the dialectic. Lenin repeatedly stated that,
26
through the process of democratic centralism, the Party must
continually update and monitor tactical and ideological
programmes to ensure their relevance to the prevailing
objective conditions of society. The important point was that
the Party must strictly follow the theory and ideology
dictated by the existing objective conditions, but as Mayer
demonstrates, these were likely to change over time and place.
And Lenin accepted the problems created by the process of
constant theoretical assessment:
It is, in fact, one of the functions of a party 
organisation and of party leaders worthy of the name, to 
acquire, through the prolonged, persistent, variegated 
and comprehensive efforts of all thinking representatives 
of a given class, the knowledge, experience and - in 
addition to knowledge and experience - the political 
flair necessary for the speedy and correct solution of 
complex political problems. 27
The apparent contradiction between uniformity and
development is largely a matter of degree and emphasis
between these two distinct trends in Marxist-Leninist
thought. On the one hand, Leninist class theory is deemed to
demonstrate the vulnerability of socialist consciousness, ie.
Lenin’s disbelief in the ability of the masses, left to
26. M. Waller. Democratic Centralism: An Historical 
Commentary. (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1981)
27. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit., p. 52.
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themselves, to make the ’’right” choice between socialist and
bourgeois ideology. This creates a strong impulse toward
theoretical and ideological uniformity. On the other hand,
Lenin attacks dogmatism and refers to ’’the necessity [for
Communists] to display the utmost flexibility in their 
28
tactics” when dealing with different objective conditions.
Indeed, Lenin accepted that the "application of the
fundamental principles of Communism...will... /nodi/y these
29
principles in certain particulars”.
These two trends are not inherently contradictory, but the 
consistency of their relationship does rely on an agreed 
interpretation of objective conditions. This clears 
the way for conflict within the international Communist 
movement. The line between justifiable compromise and 
philosophical compromise is interpretative. When do political 
events constitute changed objective conditions such as to 
justify fundamental theoretical development. Or more simply, 
what is the demarkation between tactical flexibility and 
strategic compromise.
Ultimately, these decisions must be made by the political 
leadership; by power politics. It is the ever present 
tension, rather than contradiction, between these two 
fundamental doctrinal requirements of Marxism-Leninism around 
which the history of the international movement has revolved. 
Indeed, the essence of the Sino-Soviet dispute was whether the
28. Ibid., p. 84.
29. Ibid., p. 75.
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advent of nuclear weaponry constituted a change to objective 
conditions such as to require a fundamental change of 
theoretical perceptions.
The potential for conflict created by this dual set of
doctrinal interests was never resolved by Lenin. He never
provided criteria for calculating the theoretical impact of
new objective conditions. Many sinister motives have been
30
ascribed to this failure. But Lenin himself stated that it
30. Borkenau has called Lenin a theoretical philistine, only 
interested in revolution and his own doctrinal hegemony. 
"He has often been accused of opportunism, and rightly 
so...he utterly disregarded the main items of his own 
Marxist creed when expediency demanded... he was an incarn­
ation of the Russian revolutionary movement...he must 
achieve victory. ..by ’the revo1ution’... Lenin did not care 
in the least for the established theories; he remoulded 
for the purpose what had been the accepted teachings of 
international Marxism ...overthrowing one day what he had 
established the day before." Franz Borkenau. World 
Communism; A History of the Communist International. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) pp. 47-48.
These criticisms concern Lenin’s Marxist legitimacy, his 
consistency and psychological motivation. First, Borkenau 
implies the existence of some Holy Marxist Writ against 
which Lenin offended. But surely this is a matter of 
interpretation, and a stand-point from which any innovator 
can be censured. In his paper "Our Revolution", op.cit., 
Lenin attacked so-called "impossibly pedantic" Marxists, 
and defended his innovations with Marx’s "statements that 
in times of revolution the utmost flexibility is demanded" 
(Karl Marx. The Civil War in France. Cited Ibid.) As the 
question of consistency depends on the validity of this 
claim, it is also a matter of interpretation. Finally, 
Borkenau’s comments on Lenin’s psychological motivation 
may be valid; the vitriolic and personal attacks he made 
on theoretical opponents and his refusal to agree to 
disagree certainly support the notion that he equated 
orthodoxy with his own opinions. But, while Lenin’s psych­
ological motivation does concern the source of Leninism, 
this paper is primarily concerned with the historical 
consequences of Lenin’s ideas. It is not possible within 
the confines of this sub-thesis to address these psych­
ological issues. They are noted as an important aspect of 
Lenin’s historical impact, but as ancillary to the role 
Marxist-Leninist doctrines play in the international 
Communist movement. This paper is not about the Marxist 
legitimacy of Leninism, nor the bona fides of its creator.
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was simply not possible to provide a critical framework for 
resolving this problem:
Every proletarian...sees the difference between a 
compromise enforced by objective conditions...and, on 
the other hand, a compromise by traitors who try to 
ascribe to objective causes their se1f-interest... Of 
course, in politics, where it is sometimes a matter of 
extremely complex relations - national and 
international - between classes and parties, very many 
cases will arise that will be much more difficult than 
the question of a legitimate "compromise" in a 
strike... It would be absurd to formulate a recipe or 
general rule ("No compromises!”) to suit all cases. One 
must use one’s own brains and be able to find one’s 
bearings in each particular instance. 31
This paper is concerned with the historical consequences of
Lenin’s theoretical and organizational ideas. Thus, only the
fact of Lenin’s failure to provide criteria for evaluating
objective conditions is relevant, not his reasons. The point
is that in an international movement, whose constituent
members are faced with different objective conditions, the
question of international theoretical and ideological
discipline becomes a major political problem.
The sophistication of Marxist-Leninist philosophy allows an 
international strategy based on a multiplicity of doctrinal 
approaches - validated by different objective conditions. In 
other words, one Party’s socialist ideology is another 
Party’s revisionism. Thus, international discipline involves 
ensuring that each component is ’correct’ given its peculiar 
objective conditions. But as the interpretation of objective 
conditions is a discretionary, political task the 
disciplinary process calls for extraordinary political and 
31. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit., pp. 51-52.
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ideological finesse. This is the basic dilemma of 
international communism - it is merely an operational, 
political problem, but it has unleashed enormous conflict and 
dispute within the international Communist movement. It can 
now be seen that Marxist-Leninist philosophy gives rise to 
two distinct types of theoretical interests. And 
that the process of Marxist-Leninist politics largely 
concerns the reconciliation of these interests.
First is the impulse to theoretical and ideological 
orthodoxy, uniformity and discipline. This stems from the 
vulnerability of socialist ideology in the capitalist system 
resulting from the class inability of the proletariat to 
develop socialist consciousness. It is reinforced by the 
organizational requirement for absolute discipline within the 
proletarian vanguard.
In contrast to this concern for doctrinal integrity, Marxist 
philosophy and dialectical materialism teach that theoretical 
development is a natural consequence of political action and 
historical change. These processes of dialectical progress 
ultimately lead to Communism - the highest form of economic 
and cultural life. The task of all Communist Parties is to 
distinguish between genuine theoretical development, based 
on dialectical change of objective conditions, and 
revisionist attempts to subvert socialist ideology with
bourgeois ideology.
. 30.
In short, the essence of politics in the international 
Communist movement concerns the interpretation of objective 
conditions over time and place. The key to explaining the 
history of the movement lies in the balance between 
theoretical orthodoxy and theoretical diversity - both are 
implicit to Marxism-Leninism, but not even Lenin attempted to 
provide any guide to judging the correct relationship between 
the two at any given time or under any given circumstance. 
This is the theoretical background to the process of cohesion 
and conflict in international communism.
CHAPTER I 1
S t a l i n i s t  D i s c i p l i n e  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Communi s m.
Stalinist Discipline in International Communism.
The essence of Marxist-Leninist politics lies in the 
interpretation of objective conditions. This provides the 
basis for establishing an ideological balance between the 
short-term need for discipline and the long-term requirement 
for doctrinal application. This philosophical structure is 
crucial to explaining the history of world Communism since 
the death of Lenin.
Indeed, the basic historical contention of this sub-thesis i 
that world Communism has passed through two distinct eras 
distinguished by the ascendancy of the different Marxist- 
Leninist doctrinal values of discipline and diversity. The 
current chapter will consider how the Stalinist 
interpretation of objective conditions led to the 
institution of absolute international discipline. The 
following two chapters will consider the process by which 
doctrinal diversity later developed within the international 
Communist movement.
The present concern is with the inter-war period when world
1
Communism was dominated by the Stalinist Comintern. It was
a period when both the Soviet Union and the international
movement were vulnerable. These perilous conditions aided
the rise of the revisionist doctrine of ’’Socialism in one 
2
country”, which was used as the justification for strict 
international theoretical and ideological discipline.
1. Gunther Nollau. International Communism and World 
Revolution. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).
2. See, pp. 38-41, below, for full definition and analysis 
of Stalinist revisionism.
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The Stalinist hegemony over international communism is
generally held to date from the Sixth Comintern Congress of 
3
July 1928. But as this was the climax of a long and complex
doctrinal struggle between Stalin, Trotsky and others, it is
necessary to return to the earliest days of the Comintern to
identify its Leninist foundations. This period saw
great triumphs and even greater defeats for the world
movement. The initial promise of revolutionary situations in
4
Prussia, Hungary, Bavaria and Bulgaria all ended in defeat. 
The Bolshevik state itself suffered invasion and civil war.
The Comintern considered the post-war European political
situation to be inherently revolutionary, and attributed these
5
failures to bad tactics, and worse local leadership. This
situation greatly increased the prestige of the one
successful, Bolshevik, revolution. Indeed, Lenin became
convinced that only the Bolshevik revolutionary model could
6
succeed under contemporaneous European conditions.
Again the interests of discipline and diversity are
apparent in Leninist thought. On the one hand, Lenin
demanded that ’’all Communists in all countries” display
7
”the utmost flexibility in their tactics”. On the other, the 
Twenty-One Conditions for affiliation to the Comintern
3. Stefan T. Possony. ”The Comintern as an Instrument of 
Soviet Strategy.” in M.M. Drachkovitch (Ed.) The 
Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1966) p. 221.
4. Borkenau, op.cit., pp. 108-256.
5. Ibid., pp. 171-179.
6. Lenin., Left-wing Communism, op.cit., p. 5.
7. Ibid., p. 84.
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required ’’iron discipline” and "unconditional support" of
Comintern policy, the periodical "cleansing" of party
membership and acceptance of "democratic centralism" as the
8
guiding principle of Comintern decision-making. In other
words, Lenin allowed the fraternal parties tactical 
flexibility, but only within a highly disciplined and 
co-ordinated international strategy.
The important point is that Lenin’s Comintern policy was 
merely a contingency plan relating to the specific problems 
of the contemporary movement. Indeed, Lenin was unequivocal 
on this point:
In this period of acute civil war, the Communist parties 
can perform their duties only if they are organised in a 
most centralised manner, are marked by an iron 
discipline bordering on military discipline, and have 
strong and authoritative party centres invested with 
wide powers and enjoying the unanimous confidence of the 
membership. 9
It is not, in fact, possible to identify exactly what sort of 
long-term policy Lenin envisaged for the Comintern. But, it 
is apparent that he regarded the Twenty-One Conditions as 
extraordinary measures for extraordinary conditions. This is 
a crucial element in the Leninist Comintern. The problem is 
that the early Comintern sanctioned interventionist and 
centralist policies very similar to those practiced under 
Stalin. Thus, the task is to show that Lenin saw the 
Comintern as an instrument of world revolution, not of Soviet
8. V.I. Lenin. "The Terms of Admission into the Communist 
International.” in Collected Works, op.cit, Volume 31,
p. 210.
9. Ibid. Italics added.
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foreign policy. It is this vital difference in motivation 
which distinguishes the Leninist from the Stalinist Comintern 
and establishes their different revolutionary goals.
During the early years of the Comintern a number of decisions
were taken which had very adverse consequences for the
fraternal Communist parties. The Second Comintern Congress of
1920, in which Lenin played a key role, determined to foster
world revolution on the Bolshevik model - pre-emptive vanguard
revolution, without coalition. This involved splitting labour
10
and socialist movements throughout Europe. The sincerity of 
Lenin’s motivation will be considered shortly, it is 
immediately important to examine his role in the Comintern’s 
disruption of the socialist movement within Europe.
The most famous example of Comintern mismanagement concerned 
the abortive ”March Action” of the German Communist Party, an 
armed uprising launched on 28 March 1921. The extent of 
Lenin’s personal involvement in the putsch is not known, but 
that of the Comintern is established beyond any shadow of a 
doubt. It cost the German party more than half its 
membership. Likewise, Comintern manoeuvring split the French 
Socialist Party in December 1920, the Italian Socialist Party 
in January 1921, and the French labour movement in July 1921. 
The extent of Lenin’s involvement in the process of 
splitting the European labour movement is most apparent in
10. This policy was not applied to either the British Labour 
Movement, nor to the non-European parties which were 
ordered into coalition with bourgeois nationalism.
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the case of the Italian Socialist Party. He even went so far
as to condemn Serrati’s toleration of reformism within the
Italian party in a footnote to ’Left-wing* Communism: An
11
Infantile Disorder. Indeed, Lenin was joint signatory to a
letter from the Comintern’s Executive Committee to this party
12
insisting on the expulsion of its right-wing members.
The question to be addressed is why did Lenin, the some time
advocate of independence within the fraternal parties, approve
of these various measures taken against the inclination of
local party leaders? The key lies in his continuous emphasis
upon the success of the world revolution, and the belief his
experience of the Russian revolution had given him in the
methods of his own Bolshevik revolution. A case of ”Do as I
say, not because your success will ensure my own fragile
success, but because 1 know my method works”. His comments
made in ”The Terms of Admission to the Communist
International” and later during the Fourth Congress of the
Comintern in 1922 are relevant. In the first instance, he
demanded that all parties wishing to join the Comintern must
’’selflessly” help ’’any Soviet republic in its struggle against
13
counter-revolutionary forces.” This implied a fundamental 
equality between revolutions; it certainly granted no 
particular pre-eminence to the Russian revolution per se, only 
to the methods of Bolshevism. Even Borkenau said that:
11. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit.. p. 49.
12. ’’Letter from the ECC1 to the CC of the Italian Socialist 
Party: 27 August 1920”. in Jane Degras (Ed.). The 
Communist International 1919-1943 Documents. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1956) pp. 188-191.
13. Lenin, Terms of Admission, op.cit.
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Lenin saw things exclusively from the Russian point of 
view, to be sure, but not so much from the point of view 
of the interests of the Russian state - he was sometimes 
ready seriously to impair those interests for the sake of 
the international revolution - as from the view of the 
absolute value of the Russian experience. 14
This view is strongly supported by Lenin’s comments at the
Fourth Congress of the Comintern. In open session, he
denounced the party organizational structure approved at the
previous Congress for being "almost thoroughly Russian; that
15
is to say, everything is taken from Russian conditions.” He
went on to state that ” 1 have the impression that we made a
big mistake with this reso 1ution. . .we have not yet discovered
the form in which to present our Russian experience to the 
16
foreigners.” Thus, while the Leninist Comintern over-ruled 
local Communist parties with disastrous results, it did so 
from the belief that only the Bolshevik model of revolution 
could bring forth the desired world revolution.
This then was the Leninist policy landscape over which Stalin
gained control between Lenin’s death in 1924 and the Sixth
17
Congress of the Comintern. It is important to demonstrate 
that Stalin introduced new non-Leninist policies into the 
Comintern. For, if doctrinal diversity is an inherent 
philosophical characteristic of Marxism-Leninism, then the 
absolute doctrinal discipline imposed by Stalin must be a 
repudiation of true Leninism. This is a pre-requisite for
14. Borkenau, op.cit., p. 191.
15. Cited in M.M. Drachkovitch & B. Lazitch. ’’The Communist 
International.” in Drachkovitch (Ed.), op.cit.. p. 170.
16. Ibid.
17. Possony, op.cit
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establishing that the post-Sta1inist development of doctrinal 
diversity was a return to basic Leninist principles, and not 
a revision of Marxism-Leninism.
The problem is that Stalin actually imposed a regime
operationally similar to that established by Lenin. It
involved the strictest discipline, democratic centralism and
18
periodical purges. But whereas Lenin justified these same 
procedures for a limited and extraordinary period, Stalin 
effectively established them as permanent Comintern policy. 
They were justified first by the objective conditions of an 
isolated "socialism in one country” and later by "the two 
armed camps” of the Cold War: each was alleged to create a
need for absolute doctrinal and operational discipline. But 
it was the primacy of Soviet national interest which really 
distinguished Stalin’s policies from those of Lenin.
In the inter-War period of "Socialism in one country”, Stalin 
argued that:
The final victory of Socialism is the full guarantee 
against attempts at intervention, and...restoration, for 
any serious attempt at restoration can be made only with 
...the support of international capital. Therefore, the 
support of our revolution by workers of all countries, 
and still more, the victory of the workers in at least 
several countries, is a necessary condition for fully 
guaranteeing the first victorious country against 
attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary 
condition for the final victory of Socialism. 19
18. For debate on the discontinuity of Leninism & Stalinism 
See: Stephen F. Cohen. "Bolshevism and Stalinism.” in 
R.C. Tucker. (Ed.) Stalinism: Essays in Historical 
Interpretation. (New York: Norton, 1977). pp. 3-29.
19. J. Stalin. "The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth 
Party Conference” Cited in Problems of Leninism. (Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947). p. 159.
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T h i s  wa s  t h e  d o c t r i n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  S o v i e t  c o n t r o l  a n d  
a b s o l u t e  d i s c i p l i n e  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o v e m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  S o v i e t  i s o l a t i o n .  T h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  
s t a t e  wa s  now v i e w e d  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  
v i c t o r y  o f  s o c i a l i s m .  T h u s ,  v i c t o r y  i n  o t h e r  r e v o l u t i o n s  wa s  
i m p o r t a n t  m e r e l y  a s  a  g u a r a n t e e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  s t a t e .  T h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  b e c o m e  p r i o r  t o  t h o s e  o f  
f o r e i g n  r e v o l u t i o n .
A f t e r  t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  Wa r ,  S t a l i n  u s e d  t h e  C o l d  War  t o
j u s t i f y  s t r i c t  c o n t r o l  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e :
T h e  s t r u g g l e  o f  t h e  t wo  c a m p s  d e t e r m i n e s  now t h e  f a t e  o f  
t h e  w h o l e  w o r l d ,  t h e  f a t e  o f  m a n k i n d .  T h i s  s t r u g g l e  
e m e r g e s  m o r e  a n d  m o r e  a s  t h e  c h i e f  m o v i n g  f o r c e  o f  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  o u r  a g e  t o w a r d  C o m m u n i s m.  H e r e  l i e s  t h e  
b a s i c  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e  o f  o u r  t i m e .  2 0
T h e  ’ t h i r d  l i n e ’ o r  ’ t h i r d  f o r c e ’ c o n c o c t e d  b y  t h e  
r i g h t - w i n g  s o c i a l i s t s  i s  i n  f a c t  n o t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  a 
c o v e r  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  d e f e n s e  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  a n d  f i g h t  
a g a i n s t  C o m m u n i s m.  21
At  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e  C 1 9 4 8 3 ,  t h e  s o l e  a n d  d e c i s i v e  
c r i t e r i o n  o f  p r o l e t a r i a n  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  
i s :  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  t h e  U . S . S . R . ,  t h e  f a t h e r l a n d  o f  t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r o l e t a r i a t .  . . .  O n l y  h e  i s  a  g e n u i n e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  who c a r r i e s  h i s  s y m p a t h y ,  r e s p e c t ,  
r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  ma x i mum a i d ,  
s u p p o r t  a n d  d e f e n s e  o f  t h e  U . S . S . R .  b y  e v e r y  m e a n s  a n d  
i n  v a r i o u s  f o r m s .  2 2
A g a i n ,  o b j e c t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  d e m a n d  
a b s o l u t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s c i p l i n e .  T h i s  p a p e r  i s  n o t  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  m o t i v e s ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l ,
2 0 .  T s .  A. S t e p a n i a n .  ” N e o d o l i m o e  d v i z h e n i i e  k k o m m u n i z m u . ”
i n  V o p r o s y  f i l o s o f i i .  No.  2 ,  1 9 4 8 ,  p .  8 7 .  T r a n s l a t e d  b y
a n d  c i t e d  i n  R . C .  T u c k e r .  T h e  S o v i e t  P o l i t i c a l  M i n d . 
( L o n d o n :  P a l l  M a l l ,  1 9 6 3 )  p p .  1 6 9 - 1 7 0 .
2 1 .  I b i d . , p .  1 7 0 .
2 2 .  I b i d . . p .  1 7 3 .
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Stalin may or may not have had for contriving these doctrinal 
justifications. The salient point is that, even at face 
value, they represent a different set of political values to 
those of Lenin. The basis of Marxism-Leninism lies in the 
application of political theory to the objective conditions 
of specific societies. It does not preclude, and to a 
certain extent envisages, the creation of different forms of 
Communism, and the permanent suppression of doctrinal 
diversity is a direct repudiation of this process.
The only defining, doctrinal truth in Marxist-Leninist
philosophy is that Communism ’’has its origin in capitalism,
that it develops historically from capitalism, that it is the
result of the action of a social force to which capitalism
23
has given birth.” The strategic goal of Communism is
historically inevitable, but all tactical doctrines are merely
programmatic and ideological. Yet Stalin made the Soviet
revolution a pre-requisite for socialist victory:
’’guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at
...restoration, CisD a necessary condition for the final
24
victory of Socialism”. This repudiated the historical 
inevitability of socialist victory and reduced socialism to a 
crude political force reliant on a single nation-state. 
Further, by suppressing all but the Soviet variety of 
socialism, Stalin effectively pre-determined the nature of 
Communism - he defined the whole in terms of a single part.
23. Lenin, State and Revolution, op.cit.
24. Stalin, op.cit.
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These Stalinist doctrines are only historically important 
because they gave rise to political action. It is, 
therefore, crucial to show how these doctrines influenced the 
international movement. Like all Communist policy, Stalinism 
possessed theoretical and political dimensions, but it was 
alone in degrading these separate dimensions into a 
mutually supportive network of incentives and threats.
In general, the philosophical structure of Marxism-Leninism
influences the Communist movement through a common notion of
25
political legitimacy.
Ever since Lenin launched the Bolshevik movement in 1903 
legitimacy has been of the greatest importance to 
communism. Lenin made every effort to trace his 
intellectual genealogy back to Marx and Engels...to 
conceal the Russian origins of many of his theories and 
practices. After Lenin had seized power in Russia and 
Bolshevism was broadened into a world revolutionary 
movement, the need for legitimacy became greater than 
ever before: the Third International would never have
become a powerful force if Lenin had not succeeded in 
presenting himself as the continuator of Marx and if 
the Comintern had not been accepted as the direct 
descendant of the First International. 26
It was these imperatives of Marxist-Leninist political
legitimacy which enabled Stalin to market his revisionism as
unexceptional Marxist-Leninist policy and to impose it upon
the entire Communist world.
The ability of Stalin to compel loyalty to his Comintern 
policies through purges, financial subventions, even
25. The operational relationship between theory and politics 
in Leninism will be analysed with the Sino-Soviet dispute
26. Stefan T. Possony. "The Comintern’s Claim to Marxist 
Legitimacy." in M. M. Drachkovitch and B. Lazitch (Eds). 
The Comintern: Historical Highlights. (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 3.
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assassinations, is well established and will be considered 
27
below. Yet despite this capacity to coerce both the Soviet
and other Communist parties, Stalin nevertheless sought to
present himself as a theorist of Marxism-Leninism, as "the
Lenin of our day", and his actions as consistent with Marxism-
Leninism. However cynical he was about this, the fact that he
did so testifies to the importance attached to the
"philosophical infrastructure". It must also be appreciated
that the fraternal Parties were not arms of the Soviet
government, and their policies could not always be dictated by
Soviet fiat. The CPSU, particularly before the Second World 
28
War, possessed enormous coercive influence over much of the 
international movement. Nevertheless, the acceptance of 
Stalinist policies also depended on their credibility in terms 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The committed Marxist- 
Leninists in the Communist Party of Canada, or New Zealand, 
for example, could hardly be induced or intimidated into 
revisionist policies.
In order to gain international acceptance, Stalinist policy 
needed at least some basis in Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
27. See analysis on pp. 43-44, below.
28. Before 1945 the CPSU was the only ruling party, communism 
was illegal in most central and east European countries, 
and in many of the colonies of the imperial powers. The 
leadership of these parties tended to live in exile in 
Moscow. They were physically dependent upon the Comintern, 
and in no position to challenge Stalin’s revisionism.
After 1945 a number of them became ruling parties, with 
varying degrees of continued dependence on Stalin’s 
goodwill, but with generally greater, though still, except 
in the Yugoslav case, extremely limited, capacity to 
differ; and Stalin created the crime of "national 
Communism" to prevent the spread of the Yugoslav model.
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It has been shown that Stalinist discipline was based on a
revisionist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The original
Leninist philosophy, nevertheless, included a strong impulse
to discipline. Thus, Stalin was able to utilize the plethora
of Leninist exhortations to party discipline, organizational
discipline, and the sceptre of bourgeois revisionism to
29
legitimize his policy of absolute discipline. The onus was 
on others to demonstrate that Stalin had taken Lenin out of 
context. As his prestige and power grew this became an 
increasingly difficult political task. Therefore, Stalin 
could at least claim that his policies were doctrinally valid.
It is in this way that the philosophical structure of 
Marxism-Leninism is so important to the history of the 
international movement. The impulse to discipline was a 
legitimate and essential aspect of Marxism-Leninism, accepted 
by Marxist-Leninists everywhere. And it was this legitimacy 
which enabled Stalin to give his revisionist, excessive 
centralism the appearance of legitimacy.
In addition to these doctrinal supports, Stalinism
was secured by specific power political interests. The
fraternal parties had three practical reasons for accepting
Comintern discipline. In the first instance, they were
heavily dependent on financial, technical and educational
30
support from the Soviet Union. Secondly, Stalin successfully
29. See, earlier comparison of Leninism and Stalinism at 
pp. 33-37, above.
30. Borkenau, op.cit., p. 268.
. 4 4 .
i n f i l t r a t e d  a n d  i n t i m i d a t e d  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  ma n y  f r a t e r n a l  
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p a r t i e s .  He v i o l e n t l y  p u r g e d  f o r e i g n  C o m m u n i s t  l e a d e r s  who
3 2
s o u g h t  t o  d e f y  S o v i e t  d i s c i p l i n e .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  e a r l y  
i s o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  t h e  l a t e r  t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  
C o l d  War  l e f t  t h e  n o n - g o v e r n i n g  p a r t i e s  e x t r e m e l y  v u l n e r a b l e  
a n d  e x p o s e d ,  i n  l a r g e l y  h o s t i l e  d o m e s t i c  e n v i r o n m e n t s .  T h i s  
g a v e  S t a l i n i s t  d o c t r i n e  a  p r a g m a t i c  r e l e v a n c e  a n d  a n  
i n t u i t i v e  k i n d  o f  v a l i d i t y .
I t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  e a c h  p a r t y  a f f i l i a t e d  t o  t h e  C o m i n t e r n
wa s  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s o m e  o r  a l l  o f  t h e s e
r e a s o n s .  T h e  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s  a r e  t h a t  n o  f r a t e r n a l  p a r t y  d i d
3 3
o p e n l y  d e f y  t h e  C o m i n t e r n ,  a n d  n o  p a r t y  wa s  a b l e  t o
3 4
d e v e l o p  o f f i c i a l  d o c t r i n e  i n  o p e n  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h e
o r t h o d o x  l i n e .  I n d e e d ,  ma n y  p a r t i e s  p a i d  a n  e n o r m o u s  p r i c e
3 5
t o  f o l l o w  C o m i n t e r n  p o l i c y .  T h e  a p p a r e n t  d o c t r i n a l  s e n s e  o f  
S t a l i n i s m  wa s  r e i n f o r c e d  b y  t h e  o v e r t  a n d  c o v e r t ,  f r i e n d l y  
a n d  u n f r i e n d l y ,  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  o f  t h e  S t a l i n i s t  a p p a r a t u s .
3 1 .  B.  L a z i t c h .  "Two I n s t r u m e n t s  o f  C o n t r o l  b y  t h e  C o m i n t e r n :  
T h e  E m i s s a r i e s  o f  t h e  ECCI  a n d  t h e  P a r t y  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
i n  M o s c o w " ,  i n  D r a c h k o v i t c h  & L a z i t c h  ( E d s ) ,  o p . c i t . ,
p p .  4 5 - 6 5 .
3 2 .  B.  L a z i t c h .  " S t a l i n ’ s M a s s a c r e  o f  t h e  F o r e i g n  C o m m u n i s t  
L e a d e r s . "  i n  I b i d . , p p .  1 3 9 - 1 7 4 .
3 3 .  T h e  C h i n e s e  s o m e t i m e s  i g n o r e d  S t a l i n ,  b u t  t h e y  p u b l i c a l l y  
f o l l o w e d  t h e  C o m i n t e r n  l i n e .  S e e ,  C h a p t e r  IV,  p p .  6 9 - 7 1 .
3 4 .  M a o i s m  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  S t a l i n i s m  a n d  
r e p r e s e n t s  a r c h e t y p i c a l  a d a p t i o n  o f  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  t o  
l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  b e l o w ,  p p .  6 9 - 7 0 ,  t h a t  
t h e  C h i n e s e  m e r e l y  i g n o r e d  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  u n t i l  t h e  
d i s p u t e .  T h e  l a t e r  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  w i t h  S t a l i n i s m  wa s  o n e  
o f  f o r m ,  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  r h e t o r i c  o f  t h e  a n t i - K h r u s h c h e v  
c a m p a i g n  w h i c h  c o n d e m n e d  h i m  a s  a n t i - S t a 1 i n i s t .
3 5 .  T h e  p o p u l a r  f r o n t  p o l i c y  b a d l y  h u r t  t h e  p a r t y  i n  I n d i a .  
S e e ,  G . D.  O v e r s t r e e t  & M. W i n d m i l l e r .  Co mmu n i s m i n  I n d i a . 
( B e r k e l e y  a n d  L o s  A n g e l e s :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  
P r e s s ,  1 9 5 9 )  p .  1 0 1 .
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But, from a philosophical viewpoint, it is not fundamentally 
important whether Stalin intimidated or convinced the world 
movement. The important issue is that the doctrinal diversity 
inherent to Marxism-Leninism was suppressed during Stalin’s 
regime, not for tactical, but for strategic reasons.
But the process by which Stalin controlled world Communism 
contained the seed of its own destruction. This discipline 
was based jointly on a doctrinal revision which degraded the 
importance of the fraternal parties, and a series of political 
interests with no doctrinal justification. By Stalin’s death 
adherence to international discipline was largely based on the 
interests of competitive power politics rather than doctrinal 
legitimacy. The increasing, post-war doctrinal redundancy of 
Stalinist discipline, meant that control was increasingly 
achieved by extortion of one form or another. The fraternal 
parties were doctrinally ripe for rebellion, and only powerful 
political interests tied them to Soviet doctrinal authority.
It was the potential political and, relative, material 
capacity of China to replace the Soviet Union as a support for 
the fraternal parties which ultimately enabled them to reject 
Soviet hegemony. The final decline of Stalinist discipline is 
the subject of later chapters, but it was this post-war 
situation which provided the context for aspirations towards 
diversity in several European Communist parties after the 
death of Stalin, Soviet toleration of some such aspirations
and suppression of others, and ultimately for the Sino-Soviet
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dispute. Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute appears as a catalyst, 
rather than a cause of the later renaissance in Communist 
thought.
It can now be seen that the Stalinist interpretation of 
objective conditions, before and after the Second World War, 
led to an extreme emphasis on the Marxist-Leninist requirement 
for theoretical and ideological discipline. This 
interpretation was based on the doctrinally weak contention 
that the victory of socialism required the survival of the 
Soviet revolution. This may well have represented a valid 
pragmatic assessment of contemporary politics. But it 
involved repudiation of the basic Marxist-Leninist contention 
that socialist victory is historically inevitable.
PART TWO
THE POLITICS OF MARXIST-LENINIST ACTION
CHAPTER I I I
T h e  I d e o l o g y  o f  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  D i s p u t e .
The Ideology of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.
The central task of the Communist and Workers’ Parties is to
establish ideological programmes appropriate to the objective
conditions of the societies in which they operate. This
process is ”a matter of extremely complex relations - national
i
and international - between classes and parties”. It involves
”compromise enforced by objective conditions”. It is
interpretative and inherently competitive, it produces
different ideological and political interests, with no
2
"recipe or general rule...to suit all cases”. Nevertheless, 
it is the basic political mechanism of international Leninism: 
the practical basis of all Communist action. It is this 
process of doctrinal interpretation and political compromise 
which explains the rationale for particular policy decisions 
in Marxist-Leninist organizations.
The first section of this paper concentrated on the process of 
doctrinal analysis in Marxist-Leninist political culture, and 
incidentia 1 1y established the historical imperatives of the 
Stalinist era. The current section will concentrate on the 
political history of the Sino-Soviet dispute, while confirming 
the doctrinal imperatives of Marxism-Leninism.
The basic contention of this section is that Communist 
operational policy usually results from more or less equal 
competition between ideological and political interests. The 
reason for this lies in the relationship between ideology and 
theory. Ideology has been defined as derivative of theory -
1. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit.. pp. 51-52.
2. Ibid.. p.52.
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as a set of attitudes conditioned by theory in each particular
time and place which represents specific programmes of action
3
designed to achieve theoretical goals. It can, therefore, be 
used with discretion and flexibility - as Lenin himself 
advised. Ideological interests can be sacrificed to secure 
other short-term advantages which serve the greater interests 
of Communist construction. But ultimately a point is reached 
at which further compromise of ideological interest ceases to 
advance the overall theoretical aims of the organization. It 
is at this point that pragmatic, power political interests 
fail as a basis for decision-making and the pre-eminence of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy becomes apparent.
The Sino-Soviet dispute provides a unique account of the 
inter-action between ideological and political interests in 
Marxist-Leninist organizations. It has been extremely well 
documented, and this allows for a reasonably secure assessment 
of the protagonists* various ideological and political 
interests. This chapter will consider the ideological 
dimension of the dispute, the next will address the historical 
and political process by which the latent doctrinal 
differences between the two parties became an open conflict.
The ideological dispute really stems from the different 
revolutionary experiences of each Party, which nurtured quite 
distinct approaches to what might best be called the limits of
3. This definition of ideology is based on that provided 
by Mayer, op.cit., see Introduction, p. 8, above.
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4
ideology. The basic sociological methodology of Marxism-
Leninism is In i Sfo i- i ca ! materialism which:
While not including within itself the entire totality of 
human knowledge,...studies the real world from the point 
of view of elucidating linkages and regularities common 
to all actuality, and therefore constitutes the world­
viewing and methodological basis of the natural and 
social sciences. 5
6
It provides the ”scientific-phi1osophica 1 view of the world”, 
the intellectual framework, or method, by which objective 
conditions such as modes of production and class are 
identified and analysed in order to calculate ideological 
programmes appropriate to contemporary society. It is 
proclaimed by both the CPSU and the CPC. But, unlike the 
Bolsheviks, the early Maoists placed an extraordinary emphasis 
on the palliative quality of ideology itself. The Maoist 
notions of ”right consciousness” and "permanent revolution” 
embraced the idea that "almost anything is possible to a
7
revolutionary party armed with the right consciousness”.
Indeed, Mao Tse-tung even questioned the historical
consequence of objective conditions: "Why is it that what the
Western bourgeoisie could achieve, the Eastern proletariat
8
cannot achieve also?”
4. The term "sociological methodology” is here used in the 
same sense as terms such as "historical” or "scientific” 
methodology, that is, as a methodology employed for the 
purpose of a particular discipline. Thus, "sociological” 
methodology means a methodology employed for the purposes 
of sociological analysis.
5. Military Encylopaedlc Dictionary. (Moscow: 1983) p. 232,
6. Ibid.
7. R. Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics 
of a Dispute”, in G.F. Hudson, R. Lowenthal & R. 
MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Documented and 
Ana lysed. (London: The China Quarterly, 1961) p. 10.
8. Attributed to Mao Tse-tung. "China’s Great Leap Forward:
December 1964”. in Stuart Schram (Ed.) Mao Tse-tung: 
Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-71. (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1974) p. 231.
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The current work is concerned with the result of this Maoist 
notion, rather than its particular cause. Nevertheless, the 
peculiar role of ideology in Maoism greatly influenced the 
Chinese position in the ideological dispute. It is, 
therefore, necessary to examine this matter in some detail.
The power of Maoist ideology is based on the idea of
permanent revolution, which is derived from the enormous
capacity of revolution to produce social change:
I stand for the theory of permanent revolution. Do not 
mistake this for Trotsky’s theory of permanent 
revolution. In making revolution one must strike while 
the iron is hot - one revolution must follow another, the 
revolution must continually advance. 9
This continual revolution, and the powerful forces for change
implicit to such a social condition, enables the strictures of
objective conditions to be overcome and the most extraordinary
changes to be implemented:
We cannot follow the old paths of technical development 
of every other country in the world, and crawl step by 
step behind the others. We must smash conventions... 
Haven’t we basically overthrown seemingly powerful 
imperialism, feudalism and capitalism within our country? 
From a poor and blank start haven’t we through fifteen 
years of endeavour reached an appreciable level of 
development in all aspects of socialist revolution and 
socialist construction? Haven’t we also exploded an 
atomic bomb? 10
It is the possession of "right consciousness", the correct 
ideology and the will to "smash conventions" which makes for 
success in the Maoist concept of revolution:
9. Mao Tse-tung. "Speech at the Supreme State Conference:
28 January 1958". Excerpts in Ibid., p. 94.
10. Attributed to Mao Tse-tung. "China’s Great Leap Forward: 
December 1964”. in Ibid.. p. 231.
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It is possible to catch up with Britain in fifteen years. 
We must summon up our strength and swim vigorously 
upstream...Cbut]...Our strength must he aroused and not 
dissipated. 11
If the revolution could be made perpetual and the Party
determined and ideologically correct, the vast sociological
power of revolution could impose otherwise impossible
ideological programmes. This is a consistent theme in the
history of the Chinese revolution. The rapid pace of
collectivization, the Great Leap Forward and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution all find a common rationale
in the power of ideology as an independent historical and
political force. The peculiarity of this Chinese approach is
best summarized by the followng Soviet comment:
The theory and practice of the "leap into communism" ran 
counter to the objective realities in China and the rest 
of the world, to science, the experience of the socialist 
countries and the international communist movement. It 
was clear that these voluntaristic objectives were 
unattainable, that it was impossible to leap over... 
stages in socialist construction, that slogans could not 
substitute for technology and that subjective factors 
could not be omnipotent either in the field of material 
production or in the field of social relations. 12
Thus, this dimension of Maoist thought separates it from
mainstream Marxism-Leninism. It, also, provides the ultimate
explanation for the ideological dispute. Indeed, the polemic
of the dispute only makes sense in the context of this diverse
intellectual approach. Thus, the really fundamental doctrinal
difference between the two Parties concerned the role and
significance of objective conditions on the calculation and
conduct of ideological programmes.
11. Mao Tse-tung. "Speech at the Supreme State Conference:
28 January 1958". in Ibid., pp. 94-95. Italics added.
12. O.B. Borisov & B.T. Koloskov. Sino-Soviet Relations 1945- 
1973: A Brief History. (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1975) pp. 136-137.
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The specific ideological positions of the two parties are
neatly summarized in the following statements. The first
represents the position of the Soviet Union as stated by
Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956.
When we say that the socialist system will win in the 
competition between the two systems - the capitalist and 
the socialist systems - this by no means signifies that 
its victory will be achieved through armed interference 
by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the 
capitalist countries...We have always held and continue 
to hold that the establishment of a new social system in 
this or that country is the internal affair of the 
peoples of the country concerned. 13
The Chinese position may be identified in the following
quotations from the 1960 polemic "Long Live Leninism” :
It is a great, new epoch that we are facing, and its main 
characteristic is that the forces of socialism have 
surpassed those of imperialism, that the forces of the 
awakening people of the world have surpassed those of 
reaction. 14
So long as capitalist imperialism exists in the world, 
the sources and possibility of war will remain. 15
The emancipation of the proletariat can only be arrived 
at by the road of revolution, and certainly not by the 
road of reformism. 16
Thus, the polemic of the ideological dispute can be seen to 
have centred on three distinct, but inter-re1 ated, issues: the
nature of the revolutionary epoch, the inevitability of 
violence in the revolutionary struggle and the appropriate 
form of national liberation. These points of departure do not 
stem from Leninism or Stalinism, but from the Maoist 
denigration of class structure and objective conditions.
13. N.S. Khrushchev. "Speech at the XXth Congress of the 
CPSU”. Reprinted in Hudson, op.cit., pp. 42-43.
14. "Long Live Leninism”. Article in Red Flag. 16 April 1960. 
Reprinted in Ibid.. p. 86.
15. Ibid., p. 83.
16. Ibid.
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The nature of the contemporary epoch provides the theoretical
orientation for Marxist strategic planning. The term epoch
refers to the stages of the historical process leading to
Communism. The options range from feudalism through
capitalism and socialism to communism, societies can progress
toward or regress from the ideal of Communism. The nature of
each epoch is established by its class structure:
We cannot know how fast and how successfully certain 
historical movements of the given epoch will develop. But 
we can and do know which class occupies a central 
position in this or that epoch and determines its main 
content, the main direction of its development, the main 
characteristics of the historical situation. 17
The Soviet Union saw the contemporary epoch as one in which
socialism would triumph over capitalism through gradual
competition, whereas the Chinese stated that the socialist
system had already "surpassed" imperialism as "the fundamental
18
factor in international politics".
The Soviet position was based on the idea that historical
epoch is determined by class relationships. This stemmed from
the Marxist-Leninist view that economic relations dominate
social phenomena through the mechanism of class structure and
that the potential range of social policy is limited by class
structures and the objective economic conditions upon which
18a
they rest. While Lenin attacked "pedantic Marxists", and 
used revolutionary situations to establish the "pre­
requisites" for socialism, he accepted "the general laws of
17. V.I. Lenin. "Under a False Flag" Collected Works, Vol. 
XXi, p. 125. Cited in Long Live Leninism. Ibid., p. 89.
18. W. Griffith. The Sino-Soviet Rift. (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1964) p. 20.
. See analysis of "Qur Revolution" at pp. 16-17, above.18a
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history”. He was historically interventionist, seeking to 
alter the nature of hostile economic relations, but he did not 
ignore economic conditions or try to "leap” historical epochs.
The Soviet Union accepted that the victory of the proletariat
was ”the main characteristic of the historical situation”, but
saw this as an historical process which was both incomplete
and internationally insecure. Thus, they stated that while
”the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor
19
in the development of society”, yet ”the danger of a new
20
world war still persists”. Socialist victory in the 
competition with capitalism was undoubted, but the time 
and cost of that victory was unknown and unknowable.
The Chinese position was essentially reductionist. It merged
the long-term prospects of the proletariat with immediate
capability. They claimed that ”The socialist world system
has obviously gained the upper hand in its struggle with the
21
capitalist world system”. This might be true in terms of 
the ’’tendency of the historical process”, but it hardly 
provided a rational basis for meeting the nuclear capability 
of the United States, or explaining the continued dynamism of 
capitalist society. It is a position which only makes sense 
in the context of Maoist phenomenology and the belief that the 
strength of the socialist idea is sufficient for the immediate 
completion of the already secure victory of the proletariat.
19. ’’Statement of 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties: 1960”.
Reprinted in Hudson, op.cit.. p. 178.
20. Ibid., p. 187.
21. Long Live Leninism, op.cit.. p. 95.
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In order to fully appreciate the significance of these 
different interpretations of the revolutionary epoch, it is 
necessary to consider the question of revolutionary violence, 
which played a central role in the whole ideological dispute.
The Soviet Union held that nuclear weapons threatened humanity
itself and that in the fires of nuclear war: "those who light
22
it will be the first to get burned”. This required that the
competition between socialism and capitalism be non-violent.
Working out its policy in conformity with the new 
conditions, the world communist movement could not fail 
to take account quite seriously also such an important 
factor as the radical qualitative change in the military- 
technical means of waging war resulting from the 
emergence and stock-piling of thermonuclear weapons 
possessing unprecedented destructive force. 23
The Chinese did not consider that nuclear technology could
destroy humanity. In the context of socialist supremacy, they
felt the military prowess of the socialist system should be
used immediately to meet and finally defeat imperialist
aggress ion.
if the U.S. or other imperia1ists...shou1d dare to fly in 
the face of the will of all humanity by launching a war 
using atomic and nuclear weapons, the result will be the 
very speedy destruction of these monsters encircled by 
the peoples of the world, and the result will certainly 
not be the annihilation of mankind. 24
The Chinese held that ”We Marxists must not base proletarian
policy merely on certain passing events or minute political
changes, but on the overall contradictions and class struggle
25
of a whole historical epoch.” And they felt that:
22. N.S. Khrushchev. "Speech in Peking: 30 September, 1959”. 
Extract in Hudson, op.cit., p. 62.
23. "Letter from the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the CPC:
30 March 1963". Reprinted in Griffith, op.clt., p. 245.
24. Long Live Leninism, op.cit., p. 93. Italics added.
25. Ibid.. p. 89.
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none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry 
and so on has changed, as alleged by the modern 
revisionists, the basic characteristics of the epoch ... 
Contemporary technological progress cannot save the 
capita1ist-imperia1ist system from its doom but only ring 
a new death knell. 26
The basic question at issue was whether nuclear weapons 
altered the nature of the historical epoch. The Soviet 
position was derived from a rational consideration of the 
fundamental changes in military technology. They came to the 
interpretative conclusion that violent conflict should be 
avoided, as it could result in the destruction of humanity.
But the Chinese never assessed the qualitative capacities of 
nuclear technology in any ideological polemic. Nor did they 
debate their impact upon the nature of the historical epoch. 
Instead, they merely asserted the Maoist ideal that "the most 
abundant source of strength in war lay in the masses, and that
a people’s army organized by awakened and united masses of
27
people would be invincible throughout the world." Thus, their 
position on violence effectively ignored the issue of nuclear 
technology. They classified nuclear war as a "passing event 
or minute political change", not from a rational assessment of 
its destructive capacity, but from a Maoist belief that:
"An awakened people will always find new ways to counteract a
28
reactionary superiority in arms and win victory".
This unconcern with the ideological implications of objective 
conditions was repeated in the Chinese position on forms of
26. Ibid., p. 94.
27. Ibid.. p. 93.
28. Ibid.
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national liberation. This issue involved the overall 
programme of the international movement in non-Communist 
countries. It concerned the relative merits of tactical 
parliamentarism, reformism and co11aborationism versus active 
violent revolutionary struggle. It was, of course, partly 
derivative of the Parties’ general policies on violence in the 
era of nuclear technology and the capacity of national 
liberation movements to provoke systemic violence. This 
derivative aspect of the liberation dispute does not require 
further analysis.
The debate on national liberation is more immediately 
important for the insight it provides into the protagonists’ 
different perceptions of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard. It 
was a debate about the process of historical development in 
colonial society, which acted as a test case for the validity 
of the Maoist model of revolution.
The specific ideological rationale of each Party dated from
those adopted by Lenin and M.N. Roy during the debate on
bourgeois nationalism which took place at the Second Congress
29
of the Comintern in 1920.
The Chinese argued, like Roy, that the bourgeoisie in
colonial territories were essentially reactionary in outlook.
During the Comintern debate, Roy argued that, even in
29. For details of debate see, Harish Kapur. The Soviet Union 
and the Emerging Nations: A Case Study of Soviet Policy 
Towards India. (London: Graduate Institute of
International Studies, 1972) pp. 12-17.
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relatively advanced colonial areas such as India, the
bourgeoisie was neither economically nor culturally distinct
from the imperialist social order:
therefore, the nationalist movement was ideologically 
reactionary in the sense that its triumph would not mean 
a bourgeois democratic revolution. 30
The colonial bourgeoisie could not be expected to perform a
progressive historical role. From this premise, Roy went on
to pre-empt the Maoist revolutionary model:
the foremost objective was to set up Asian Communist 
parties which would organize the peasants and workers and 
lead them on to Communist revolutions. 31
The People’s Daily echoed this early Asian communist approach
when it attacked Nehru for espousing non-alignment:
a mere facade behind which he is actually carrying out a 
policy of opposing the national revolutionary movements 
of various countries, opposing socialism and serving 
imperia1 ism. 32
The position of the Soviet Union was based on the Leninist 
contention that bourgeois nationalism was a progressive 
historical force in societies virtually devoid of proletarian 
groups. The process of economic, thence social and political, 
development was enhanced by the progress from colony to 
independent nation. Lenin stated that ”The Communist 
International must enter into a temporary alliance with
33
bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries”.
30. M.N. Roy. Memoirs. (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964). 
p. 379.
31. Kapur, op.cit.. p. 13.
32. ”More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the Light of the Sino- 
Indian Boundary Question”. Peoples Daily. 27 October 1962. 
Cited in Griffith, op.cit.. p. 58.
33. ’’Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial 
Question”, in V.I. Lenin. The National Liberation Movement 
in the East. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976). p. 270.
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Under Khrushchev emphasis was placed on alliance with
bourgeois nationalism or ’’national democracy”. This alliance
included general non-interference in colonial politics through
the principle of ideological diversity. Thus:
The CPSU has always hailed and will continue to hail the 
revolutionary working class and the working people of any 
country who, headed by their communist vanguard, make 
skilful use of the revolutionary situation to inflict a 
crushing blow against the class enemy and to establish a 
new social system. 34
[But]...a revolution cannot be artificially instigated if 
conditions for it are not yet ripe. 35
This position was consistent with the Leninist texts, although
it tended to down play the ideological consequences of Lenin’s
imprecations against neo-imperialism:
the deception systematically practiced by the imperialist 
powers, which, under the guise of politically independent 
states, set up states that are wholly dependent upon them 
economically, financially and militarily. 36
It is not possible to provide a full account of Soviet and 
Chinese attitudes to the various national liberation 
movements. The present task is to distinguish those policy 
differences which highlighted each party’s approach to 
diversity within international Communism. It is apparent that 
the Soviet policy left more room for diversity than the 
Chinese, because it did not prescribe the nature of post­
liberation society.
These attitudes directly mirror the Lenin-Roy debate at the 
Second Comintern Congress of July 1920 on the merits of 
two-stage versus one-stage revolution. It is a debate which
34. ”Letter from the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the CPC:
30 March 1963. Reprinted in Griffith, op.cit.. p. 249.
35. Ibid.
36. Lenin, Draft Theses, op.cit.
. 62 .
has been an important cause of dissent within the world 
Communist movement, and a factor in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
The Soviet Union’s adherence to the ** t wo - s ta ge ” doctrine led 
it to support nationalist leaders - like Nasser, Nehru,
Sukarno and Castro - some of whom acted strongly against their 
local Communists. The Chinese, however, adopted the 
”one-stage” doctrine which took a pessimistic view of the 
national bourgeoisie in the Third World. This led to a policy 
of actively supporting revolutionary struggles between 
Communist coalitions of peasants and workers against the 
nationalist bourgeoisie. The Soviet Union viewed bourgeois 
nationalism as progressive, supported it with aid and against 
imperialist attack. This justified a policy of non-inter­
vention in the revolutionary conditions of the Third World.
The fundamental problem was that colonial and post-co1 onia 1
societies did not possess groups which could be equated with
the Marxist proletariat. The Soviet position was directly
supported by Lenin’s view that:
the more backward the country, the stronger is the hold 
of small-scale agricultural production, patriarcha1ism 
and isolation, which inevitably 1 end. ..strength and 
tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices. 37
These societies did not possess the class structures able to
produce and sustain a socialist revolution. Unless they were
38
fortunate enough to be part of the Soviet Union, revolution
was not possible until "the entire foundation of the backward
39
countries’ economic life has radically changed”.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid
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The Chinese position, by contrast, effectively rejected this 
Leninist interpretation of colonial and post-colonial society. 
It was based on the Maoist notion of a peasant led revolution. 
Indeed, Maoists considered the doctrine of peasant revolution 
to be the ultimate extension of the Leninist idea that a 
disciplined, ideological vanguard could establish socialism 
through revolution. But, whereas the Leninist vanguard sought 
to alleviate the worst consequences of objective conditions, 
the Maoist vanguard sought to override them completely. The 
Chinese position on the revolutionary epoch and the use of 
violence in the revolutionary struggle, stemmed from the basic 
Maoist idea that discipline and ideological purity can 
overcome objective conditions.
Thus, in the polemical exchanges between the Soviet and
Chinese leadership, the latter made no attempt to analyse the
objective conditions operating in Third World states in any
detail. And utterances by Chinese leaders did nothing to
suggest a close consideration of conditions in the real Third
World. Gn the contrary, Mao’s theory of the ’’Intermediate
40
Zone”, first put forward in 1949, had come by 1964 to lump
together not only the whole of the Third World but also most
developed countries into one grouping which when added to the
socialist countries allegedly made ninety per cent of the
41
world’s population opposed to US imperialism. Similarly, his
40. For analysis see: Oton Ambroz. Realignment of World Power. 
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1972) pp. 37-39.
41. Mao Tse-tung, reported in "All the World’s Forces Opposing 
U.S. Imperialism, Unite!" in Peking Review. No. 4,
24 January 1964.
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"Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s Political Economics"
(variously dated between 1960 and 1962) not only argued
naively that revolution is easier in backward than in advanced
countries because the bourgeoisie is weaker, but argued at a
high level of generalization, with hardly any mention of
42
specific Third World countries. In June 1964, Chou En-lai had
to cut short a tour of Africa after injudiciously stating in
Tanzania that "At present, a strong revolutionary storm can be
43
sensed in Africa and Asia; the time is near."; and in 1965,
Lin Piao defined "the principle contradiction in the
contemporary global situation" as that between "US
imperialism" and "the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa
44
and Latin America". All these statements serve to illustrate 
the undifferentiated approach of the Chinese leadership to the 
Third World, which took no account of the widely differing 
objective conditions in individual Third World countries.
The essence of the ideological dispute may be found in the
following section of the "Long Live Leninism" article:
The modern revisionists, proceeding from their absurd 
arguments on the current world situation and from their 
absurd argument that the Marxist-Leninist theory of class 
analysis and class struggle is obsolete, attempt to
42. Mao Tse-tung. "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s
Political Economics." Reprinted in Miscellany of Mao Tse- 
tung’ s Thought: 1949-1968. (Arlington, Va: Joint
Publications Research Service, 1974) p. 247-313.
43. Chou made a similar statement earlier in 1964 during a
visit to the Somali Republic, when he refered to the 
"excellant revolutionary situation" in Africa. For 
details of these two African tours by Chou see; Li 
Tien-min. Chou En-lai. (Taipai: Institute of International
Relations, 1970) pp. 313-317, and Jules Archer. Chou 
En-lai. (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973) p. 125-127.
44. Lin Piao. "Long Live the Victory of People’s War." in
Peking Review. No. 36, 3 September 1965. pp. 9-30.
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totally overthrow the fundamental theories of Marxism- 
Leninism on a series of questions like violence, war, 
peaceful coexistence. 45
The point is that "questions like violence, war, peaceful 
coexistence” are questions about objective conditions. It is 
legitimate to debate the significance of objective conditions, 
the reality of particular conditions and their impact upon 
ideology. But the Chinese assessed the impact of objective 
conditions not in terms of their social, military, political 
or even economic validity, but in terms of their ideological 
legitimacy. The debate for the Chinese was about "dogma", 
"legitimacy”, "rectitude”, not about the appropriateness of 
Maoist political and military ideology.
The revolutionary struggle convinced Mao Tse-tung that class 
structure, socio-economic development - objective conditions - 
could not prevent successful socialist endeavour in Asian 
peasant society. The very reality of the Chinese revolution 
seemed to disprove the contention that objective conditions 
could dictate the limits of ideological action.
Thus, objective conditions were assessed in terms of ideology, 
but ideology was never reassessed on the basis of objective 
conditions. The Chinese viewed their revolution as the best 
expression of the Leninist principle of vanguard revolution, 
and colonial revolution as the natural heir of the Chinese 
revolution. Thus, to deny the validity of immediate colonial 
revolution, as did the CPSU, was to challenge the doctrinal 
legitimacy of the Chinese revolutionary experience.
45. Long Live Leninism, op.cit., p.94.
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T h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  C h i n a  
d e v e l o p e d  o u t  o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  e a c h  P a r t y .  
T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  s e e n  t o  h a v e  c r e a t e d  
p a r t i c u l a r  p o w e r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  a p p r o a c h  t o  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  e p o c h ,  t o  v i o l e n c e ,  t o  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  w e r e  
n o t  a b s t r a c t  d o c t r i n a l  o r  p h i l o s o p h i c  n i c e t i e s .  T h e y  
e s t a b l i s h e d  d i s t i n c t i v e  g u i d e l i n e s  t o  o p e r a t i o n a l  p o l i c y .
T h e y  p r o v i d e d  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  r e g i m e ,  n o t  o n l y  
f o r  i t s  f o r e i g n  a n d  d e f e n c e  p o l i c y ,  b u t  f o r  i t s  v e r y  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y .  T h e s e  w e r e  m a t t e r s  o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
p o l i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e .
T h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r o t a g o n i s t s  o n l y  p r o v i d e d  
t h e  b a s i s  f o r  c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  c o n f l i c t  wa s  a  
p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  I t  i s  now a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
p r o c e s s  b y  w h i c h  t h e s e  f u n d a m e n t a l  i d e o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  
o r d e r e d  a n d  c o m p r o m i s e d  b e f o r e  a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  d i s p u t e .  Th e  
f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  r i s e  a n d  f a l l  o f  
i d e o l o g i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e  i n  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  And ,  
t h u s ,  e x p l a i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  b y  w h i c h  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  p h i l o s o p h y  
c o m e s  u l t i m a t e l y  t o  d o m i n a t e  C o m m u n i s t  a c t i o n .
CHAPTER IV
T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  D i s p u t e .
The Politics of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.
The present task is to explain the process by which the 
latent doctrinal differences between the CPSU and the CPC 
developed into outright conflict.
This chapter will contend that the early political 
relationship between the two Communist states was 
predicated on Chinese preparedness to subjugate their 
ideological beliefs to those of the CPSU in order to obtain 
economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. It will 
further contend that the progressive failure of successive 
Soviet regimes to support Chinese foreign policy objectives 
led to an increasingly strong assertion of the Chinese 
ideological position. The proposal will be made that this 
process of ideological assertion served as the basic 
precipitant of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
In the preceding chapter the ideological priorities of the 
CPSU and the CPC were considered as part of a larger study 
of the process by which ideological and political interests 
are ordered in Marxist-Leninist organizations. This 
chapter is concerned to complete that study by 
investigating the limits of compromise and the mechanism of 
priority in Communist politics. It will proceed by 
examining the political process which led the CPC to 
endorse, and then reject, certain ideological positions of 
the CPSU which were contrary to Maoist theoretical and 
ideological tradition.
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By the time of Stalin’s death, the CPSU had long enjoyed the
mantle of doctrinal leadership in the international Communist
movement. Indeed, even Mao Tse-tung proclaimed Soviet
1
leadership at the Moscow Conference of 1957. Nevertheless, 
early Sino-Soviet diplomacy was based on the rather ambivalent 
relationship which had existed between the two parties prior 
to the Chinese Revolution.
The seeds of this ambivalence date from the Second Comintern
Congress of 1920 and the debate between Lenin and Roy on the
appropriateness of proletarian leadership in colonial 
2
revolution. The debate was inconclusive, but Lenin had been
inclined to encourage bourgeois nationalism in the colonial 
3
situation. In the event, Stalin applied this approach to
China and consistently championed the Kuomintang as
representatives of the next appropriate - bourgeois - stage in
4
the scientific development of Chinese political society.
This policy led to the ill-fated Comintern decision to 
assimilate the CPC into the Kuomintang. The subsequent 
massacre of 1927 left a deep impression on the Chinese party 
and paved the way for Mao’s rise to power. Even in 1960 the 
Chinese remembered the incident with bitterness:
1. Alfred A. Low. The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the 
Polemics. (London: Associated University Press, 1976) p. 82
2. Kapur, op.cit., p. 13.
3. For analysis of the role played by this issue in the 
developing ideological dispute see, Chapter III, above, 
pp. 58-65.
4. For detailed analysis of the Comintern’s united front
policy, see: E.H. Carr. The Twilight of Comintern: 1930-
1935. (London: Macmillan, 1982).
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Chen Tu-hsiu* s opportunism as shown over the policy 
towards the Communist Party’s united front with the 
Kuomintang was a departure from the principles and stand 
which a Communist Party should uphold. He advocated that 
the Communist Party should in principle be reduced to the 
level of the Kuomintang. The result was defeat for the 
revo1ution. 5
Indeed, the whole thrust of the Maoist peasant revolution was 
contrary to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist formulation of 
proletarian led revolution. The Maoist strategy was only
6
reluctantly endorsed by Stalin and the Comintern in 1937, 
and even then Stalin maintained little expectation of a 
Communist victory.
7
Despite Chinese support for the Comintern and the ’’vanguard”
role of the CPSU, the CPC was extremely wary of the Soviet
leadership after 1927. Mao persistently ignored Soviet
advice. In February 1948, Stalin is reported to have told
Tito that after the Second World War he had invited the CPC
leadership to Moscow for talks on the situation in China.
”We told them bluntly that we considered the development 
of the uprising in China had no prospect and that the 
Chinese comrades should seek a modus vivendi with Chiang” 
yet the Chinese comrades, "went back to China and acted 
quite otherwise”. 8
This contrasts with the close diplomatic relationship between 
1949 and 1956 which resulted from a special congruence of 
doctrinal and political interests. The titanic prestige of 
Stalin, together with the conditions of the Cold War, and 
Chinese preparedness to ignore Soviet advice, explains the
5. Long Live Leninism, op.cit., p. 108.
6. Low, op.cit.. pp. 39-44.
7. 1960 Moscow Statement, op.cit. p. 204.
8. V. Dedijer. Tito Speaks: His Self-Portrait and Struggle
with Stalinism. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953) p. 322.
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P RC’ s p u b l i c  a c q u i e s c e n c e  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d o c t r i n a l  
d i s c i p l i n e .  B u t  m o r e  i m m e d i a t e l y  i m p o r t a n t  w e r e  t h e  
m a t e r i a l  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  b e n e f i t s  o f  c l o s e  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
S o v i e t  Un i  o n .
D u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  C h i n e s e  w e r e  o b l i g e d  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  a
s i t u a t i o n  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l  ” f 1 e x  i b  i 1 i t y ” i n  o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  t h e
g r e a t e r  g o a l s  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  R e v o l u t i o n .  T h e  PRC wa s
d a n g e r o u s l y  i s o l a t e d  a f t e r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  v i c t o r y  o f  1 9 4 9 .
9
T h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  T r e a t y  o f  1 9 5 0  p r o v i d e d  C h i n a  w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
a n d  m i l i t a r y  r e s o u r c e s  i t  n e e d e d  t o  u n d e r t a k e  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s e c u r i t y .  C h i n a  a n d  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  a l s o ,  s h a r e d  a  c ommon s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r e s t  i n  
p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  d e m i s e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  r e g i m e  i n  N o r t h  K o r e a .
I t  i s  n o t  p r o p o s e d  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  S i n o - S o v i e t  r e l a t i o n s
d u r i n g  t h e  S t a l i n i s t  e r a .  B u t  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  e v e n
b e f o r e  1 9 5 7  C h i n e s e  g e o p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  s e r v e d  m o r e  b y
t h e  h o p e  t h a n  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t .  U n d e r  S t a l i n  a n d
K h r u s h c h e v  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a i d  wa s  p r o v i d e d  t o  t h e
PRC.  B u t ,  S t a l i n  k e p t  t h e  K o r e a n  c o n f l i c t  a t  a r m s  l e n g t h  i n
1 0
o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  d i r e c t  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  US.  T h e  v e r y
" c r i m e "  f o r  w h i c h  K h r u s h c h e v  wa s  l a t e r  c o n d e m n e d  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e .
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  PRC wa s  r e q u i r e d  t o  f i n a n c e  m i l i t a r y  e q u i p m e n t
11
s u p p l i e d  b y  S t a l i n  d u r i n g  t h e  K o r e a n  Wa r .  T h u s ,  t h e  C h i n e s e
9 .  T r e a t y  o f  F r i e n d s h i p ,  A l l i a n c e  a n d  M u t u a l  A s s i s t a n c e .  
S i g n e d  b y  t h e  USSR a n d  t h e  PRC i n  F e b r u a r y  1 9 5 0 .
1 0 .  E d w a r d  C r a n k s h a w .  " C o m m e n t s  o n  C h a p t e r  1 1 ” i n  K h r u s h c h e v  
R e m e m b e r s . ( B o s t o n :  L i t t l e ,  B r o w n  & C o . ,  1 9 7 0 )  p .  3 6 7 .
1 1 .  K e e s i n g ’ s R e s e a r c h  R e p o r t .  T h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  D i s p u t e . 
( B r i s t o l :  K e e s i n g ’ s P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  1 9 7 0 )  p p .  6 5 - 6 6 .
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had good reason to doubt the reliability of the USSR long 
before Khrushchev, but Stalin’s prestige and the pressing needs 
of the Chinese in the early period of the PRC were apparently 
sufficient to forestall the breakdown in relations which 
occurred under Stalin’s heirs.
Thus, the bonds between these Communist giants were forged
despite, rather than because of, their historical relationship
and, as has already been shown, their different revolutionary
struggles. The Sino-Soviet relationship, after the death of
Stalin, was well summarized by Edward Crankshaw:
A powerful group of veterans, for forty years 
masters of their own fate, for fifteen years masters 
of their own country, which they conquered by their 
own unaided efforts, are not in the best of times 
going to look kindly on a group of Russian parvenus, 
who took no part in any revolution, who were the 
creatures of Stalin, or those creatures’ creatures.
They are certainly not going to take any orders 
from them. 12
The foreign policy of the PRC has long been dominated by
13
three major issues: independence, modernity and revolution.
Between 1957 and 1962, the primary purpose of the regime was 
the successful completion, protection and extension of the 
Maoist revolution. This required political and economic 
independence, which in turn demanded complete national 
sovereignty, military capability, industrial and technological 
modernity. This policy agenda defined the geopolitical 
priorities of the regime and established the foreign policy
12. Edward Crankshaw. The New Cold War: Moscow v Pekin.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963) p. 44.
13. Wang Gungwu. China and the World since 1949. (London: 
Macmillan, 1977). pp. 2-8.
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objectives which dominated the Sino-Soviet dispute. The 
specific concerns of the Chinese were the liberation of 
Taiwan; consolidation of Tibet; economic, military and 
technological development; and nuclear capability. They, 
also, had associated interests in the acceptance of the PRC as 
a leading Communist power and of Maoism as the model for 
colonial and post-colonial revolution.
The issues involved in the process of compromise were those 
considered in detail in Chapter III above: peaceful 
co-existence, violent revolutionary struggle and the role of 
bourgeois nationalism in post-colonial societies. It is 
not proposed to undertake a global analysis of the Byzantine 
and contradictory ideological compromises which occurred at
14
the inter-Party conferences held at Moscow in 1957 and 1960. 
Such an account would require a separate study, but would not 
properly reflect the nature of the ideological confrontation.
The fundamental doctrinal difference between the two Parties
related to the ideological significance of objective
conditions. This situation existed under Stalin, but did not
give rise to any major operational differences between the two
states. The PRC, while pursuing the distinctive ideology of
Maoism, publicly endorsed the Stalinist line and received
limited material and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union.
This situation was altered when Khrushchev clarified the
ideological policy of the CPSU in line with the objective
14. For analysis of the ideological politics of the various 
Moscow Conferences, see: Griffith, op.c1t.
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conditions of the post-war era. The Khrushchev dispensation 
did not create the differences between Soviet and Maoist 
ideology, but its operational policies increasingly and more 
directly challenged those of China and, thus, gave the 
ideological differences a major operational significance.
The process of compromise was more exactly a process of 
increasing Chinese inclination to expose the differences 
between the two Parties. The compromises made on the 
conference floor were minimal and subsequent communiques 
merely statements of solidarity open to interpretation 
sufficient to support the ideological stance of each Party.
The real compromise was Chinese preparedness to accept the 
charade of doctrinal unity. But this rested on the 
satisfaction of certain Chinese geopolitical interests. Thus, 
an item by item account of the ideological intrigues is of no 
real benefit. The current study is best served by an analysis 
of the progressive degeneration of the Sino-Soviet ideological 
relationship as manifested in substantive political relations 
between the USSR and the PRC from 1957 to 1962.
The liberation of Taiwan is the longest standing foreign 
policy concern of the PRC. And its impact on the Sino-Soviet 
relationship was remarkably consistent throughout the 
Khrushchev period. The situation in 1954-55 was that:
The discrepancy between China’s conflict with the United
States and Russia’s hopes for detente grew larger as the
United States and the USSR moved towards the summit. 15
15. Thomas E. Syopler. China. Taiwan and the Offshore Islands.
(New York: \hs^pe, 1985) p. 101.
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A similar process could be observed during the 1958 crisis:
Mao could no longer defer to Khrushchev’s wish for 
peaceful coexistence with the United States. The PRC was 
about to take further determined action to defend its 
interests, and the USSR could not be allowed to veto. 16
The Chinese and Soviet policies with respect to Taiwan were
based on their different ideological approaches to nuclear war
and the requirements of peaceful co-existence with the United
States. The status of Taiwan reached crisis point twice
before the public outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute. And,
although neither incident was sufficient of itself to disrupt
public solidarity, each contributed to the growing Chinese
dissatisfaction with Soviet policy.
The Soviet position on the 1958 crisis was typical. On
30 June 1958, the PRC called for the United States to resume
Ambassadorial Talks on the status of Taiwan, and commenced
artillery bombardment of Quemoy on 23 August. The USSR pledged
moral and logistic support to the PRC through Pravda articles
on 31 August, 5 and 20 September, but:
in spite of these threats, neither the writer of the 
article nor the Soviets in subsequent declarations gave a 
definite pledge to China to come militarily to her 
assistance in the event of a ... conflagration. 17
The impasse was broken on 6 September when Chou En-lai
announced that the PRC would accept an American offer to
resume Ambassadorial Talks on 15 September. It ended on
6 October when China proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire. The
pertinent fact is that Khrushchev did not inform Eisenhower
16. Ibid.. p. 119.
17. Low, op.cit., p. 89.
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of Soviet support for the Chinese position until 7 September,
and did not offer a nuclear guarantee for the Chinese until
18
19 September - when a peaceful settlement was assured. Thus,
The outcome of the Taiwan crisis may have been a 
diplomatic defeat for Peking, but it strengthened its 
desire for its own nuclear deterrent. Also, it must have 
raised many a doubt in the Chinese mind about the 
reliability of the Sino-Soviet military tie-up, and 
especially about its possible use in wresting concessions 
from the U .S . 19
This refusal of the USSR to sacrifice the publicly agreed 
ideological policies of the international movement - peaceful 
coexistence - in the interest of Chinese foreign policy was to 
become a major, recurring problem in Sino-Soviet relations.
The ideological issue of peaceful co-existence was combined
with that of national liberation in the Soviet policy on the
Sino-Indian border dispute in Tibet. The basic ideological
attitudes of the CPSU and the CPC to bourgeois nationalism
have already been considered: the CPSU supported, the CPC
opposed, bourgeois nationalism such as was embodied in the
Indian constitution. The ideological attitude of the Chinese
was reinforced by the suspicion that India had supported "the
20
reactionary clique of the Tibetan upper strata", during the 
Tibetan uprising in August 1959. This suspicion was fuelled 
by the Indian refusal to renegotiate the inherited colonial 
border - the McMahon Line.
St 
Lo
"The Truth about how the Leaders of the CPSU have allied 
themselves with India against China", in Peoples Daily.
2 November 1963. Cited in Low, Ibid., p. 99.
pljer, o p . c i t . , p. 
o p .c i t ., p. 90.
119.
r
18.
19.
20 .
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A series of border incidents took place between 1959 and 1962.
On 25 and 26 August 1959, the People’s Liberation Army occupied
the frontier post of Longju, territory claimed by China. Not
only did the Soviet Union fail to support the occupation,
but on 9 September 1959 Tass Agency expressed regret over
the incident and blamed Western interests for attempting to
21
drive a wedge between the PRC and India. This amounted
to a declaration of neutrality by the Soviet Union, which
the PRC later described as a ’’tendentious communique” that
22
"revealed our Sino-Soviet differences” to the world. The
Soviet position of neutrality was confirmed after the Ladakh
23
Incident of October 1959. The Soviets viewed Chinese
belligerence as "torpedoing the relaxation of international 
24
tension”, whereas the Chinese viewed Soviet neutrality as a
25
betrayal of socialist solidarity. These respective positions 
were current up to and during the Sino-Indian War of 1962.
-i. / ; >k,
The different ideological perspectives of the CPSU and CPC 
influenced their overall geopolitical outlook. The issues of 
Taiwan, Tibet and India were important expressions of the two 
Parties’ different world-views. But these issues were merely 
symptomatic of deeper tensions within the relationship.
21. Keesing’s Research Report, op.cit., p. 19.
22. Teng Hsiao-ping. "Address to the 1960 Moscow Conference". 
Cited in Ibid., p. 20.
23. This concerned an area - Aksai Chin - India claimed to 
administer but through which the Chinese had built a 
strategically important road, undetected by the Indian 
"administrators”. Low, op.cit., p. 101.
24. "Soviet Government Statement". Pravda. 21 September 1963. 
Cited in Ibid.
25. People’s Daily. 27 February 1963. Cited in Ibid., p. 100.
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Indeed, after the 1957 Conference the Sino-Soviet relationship 
was really based on irreconcilable ideological, political and 
strategic interests. The history of the geopolitical 
relationship between 1957 and 1962 is essentially a catalogue 
of specific events arising from the fundamental contradiction 
between Soviet and Chinese ideology and foreign policy.
In 1959 the USSR reneged on its agreement to supply the PRC
26
with nuclear technology. In 1960 the USSR unilaterally ended
all scientific and technical aid to China. The withdrawal
devastated the Chinese economy, a situation exacerbated when
returning technicians removed working blueprints and operating 
27
manuals. In 1961 Khrushchev launched a thinly veiled attack
on CPC policies in his assault on Albania at the Twenty-second
28
Congress of the CPSU. In 1962 the USSR, which had supplied
India with military technology throughout the long Sino-Indian
border dispute, failed to support the PRC when that dispute
29
erupted into open war. Ultimately, the Chinese were left
without political compensation for the suppression of their
full ideological programme at the 1957 and 1960 Conferences,
something no Communist could endure without good reason.
By the end of 1962, when the USSR seemed to side with 
India during the Sino-Indian war, along with the USA and 
all its allies, there was no longer a good reason to keep 
the conflict muted and indirect. 30
26. Wang Gungwu, op.cit.. p. 102.
27. Keesing’s Research Report, op,cit., p. 29.
28. CC of the CPSU. "Documents of the Twentieth Congress of 
the CPSU". in The Road to Communism. (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, n.d.)
29. Low, op.cit., pp. 126-131.
30. Wang Gungwu, op.cit.
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This was the process by which the Sino-Soviet relationship
developed into open conflict. The objectives of Chinese
foreign policy were all frustrated by Soviet refusal to
support them with the military might of the socialist world.
The Soviet policy threatened Chinese geopolitical interests in
Taiwan and Tibet, and denied the PRC nuclear technology. The
economic and industrial development of the PRC was disrupted
by the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid. The status of the
Maoist revolutionary model was itself compromised by the
Soviet ideological position on peaceful co-existence and
31
colonial liberation. The pretensions of the PRC to co­
leadership of the socialist bloc - manifest in their 
intervention in the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 - were 
implicitly denigrated by the apparent contempt with which the 
CPSU treated the political and ideological interests and 
sensitivities of the PRC and the CPC.
But the fundamental issue related to the use of the military
resources of the socialist bloc, which ultimately meant
nuclear weaponry. The Chinese view of the epoch and of
violence was predicated on the overwhelming military power of
the socialist bloc. But this could only be utilized by the
Soviet Union. The different approach of the two Parties to
violence caused difficulty precisely because the epoch
changing military might of socialism was based exclusively on
Soviet nuclear technology. A basic cause of the dispute lay
31. For details of the link between the Soviet positions on 
peaceful co-existence and colonial liberation, and the 
legitimacy of the Maoist model of revolution, see Chapter 
III, above, pp. 58-65.
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in the fact that the Chinese could not activate the 
technological process which would allow for socialist victory.
This doctrinal dependence on Soviet nuclear capability caused 
the CPC great frustration. And it was the failure of the USSR 
to deliver this promised technology which released the CPC 
from any political or ideological loyalty to the USSR. This 
was instrumental in the Chinese decision to reject Soviet 
ideological hegemony, to assert Maoist ideology and, in 
consequence, to split the international Communist movement.
The Chinese claim that Khrushchev promised to supply the PRC
32
with nuclear technology on 15 October 1957, that an
agreement confirming the arrangement was concluded on 18
October, and that a protocol was signed on 18 January 1958
establishing a five-year programme of scientific co-operation
33
by which nuclear technology would be supplied.
It is indicative of the extent of the ideological distance
between the two Parties that Khrushchev did not proceed to
supply the Chinese with any such technology. Indeed, it is
generally agreed that Khrushchev only promised the technology
in order to secure Chinese acquiescence with the doctrine of
peaceful co-existence at the 1957 Moscow Conference.
Mao’s move at the Moscow Conference to flatter the Soviet 
ego was apparently made in exchange for what he 
considered all-important military and economic aid. 34
32. Griffith, op.cit., p. 17.
33. Low, op.cit., p. 83.
34. Ibid.
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The problem was that if Khrushchev had supplied the Chinese 
with nuclear technology, he would have effectively denied the 
value of the Chinese concession to peaceful co-existence. The 
Chinese wanted nuclear weapons because the Soviet Union would 
not seriously risk their use, and the Soviet Union promised to 
supply these weapons so as to prevent China stating that this 
risk should be taken. This situation marked the limit of 
practical political compromise between the two ideological 
positions.
The violent struggle which allegedly took place at the 1957
Conference resulted in public solidarity, but did not
reconcile the different ideological positions of the two 
35
Parties. The Soviet Union retained a foreign policy based 
on peaceful co-existence and sought to avoid international 
confrontation. The PRC, convinced of socialist capacity to 
survive even nuclear war, actively pursued confrontationist 
foreign policy objectives. Thus, the USSR and PRC came to 
propound foreign policies which were diametrically opposed.
The history of the Sino-Soviet dispute presents a case study 
in Communist decision-making. This study reveals that Soviet 
and Chinese policies were based on the calculated and flexible 
pursuit of ideological and power political interests. This 
policy flexibility was necessitated by the inherent conflict
35. For an account of the bargaining process see, ’’Origin and 
Development of the Differences Between the Leadership 
of the CPSU and Ourselves - Comment on the Open Letter of 
the CC of the CPSU”. People’s Daily and Red Flag. 6 Sept. 
1963. Reprinted in Griffith, op,cit., pp. 388-420.
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between the ideological and political interests of the two
states: a conflict derived from their different interpretations
of objective conditions. It is, therefore, reasonable to
contend that the dispute represented a rare public example of
what Lenin called "compromise enforced by [disputed] objective 
36
conditions” : the fundamental problem of a Leninist party.
The limits of doctrinal flexibility, the limits of compromise, 
are exposed in the ideology of Sino-Soviet relations after the 
1957 Moscow Conference. It was a situation in which the PRC 
could only secure its political interest in obtaining nuclear 
technology, by compromising its ideological interest in nuclear 
belligerence. Obviously, such an ideological compromise would 
have removed the doctrinal basis for the original political 
interest in gaining nuclear technology.
This was a case in which the political benefit of ideological 
compromise was negated by the process of compromise. And it 
suggests that the practical limits of compromise between 
ideological and political interests are reached when the 
success of a political interest can only be achieved by a 
compromise which negates the benefit of its success.
To the extent that philosophy represents ”a set or system of
37
ultimate values” and that political interests are simply the 
immediate practical manifestation of the priorities and values 
which motivate political action, it is legitimate to claim
36. Lenin, Left-wing Communism, op.cit., p. 51.
37. See definition of philosophy, Introduction, pp. 8-9, above.
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that political interests are derived from philosophical values.
It follows that political success is a matter of
philosophical interpretation. It also follows that the
political interests of Marxism-Leninism are ultimately defined
by the benefit they bring to the promotion of Communist ideals.
38
This was not only the directive of Lenin himself, it is also
the only rationally meaningful purpose of Marxist-Leninist
action, as specifically Marxist-Leninist action. Thus, while
political interests are distinct from ideological interests as
operational phenomena, they serve to promote identical
philosophical interests. It is in this sense that theory and
ideology are ultimately more important than power political
interests in Marxist-Leninist politics. In terms of Marxist
phenomenology, this is an example of the unity between theory 
39
and action.
Thus, although Lenin denied a "recipe or general rule” for the 
conduct of ideological compromise, it is possible to establish 
the limits of ideological compromise - the point at which 
compromise becomes philosophically invalid. This occurs when
38. Lenin proclaimed the leading role of revolutionary theory 
in the formation of Bolshevik policy in What Is To Be Done? 
op.cit., see analysis in Chapter I, pp. 14-15, above.
39. This paper is concerned with Marxist-Leninist, rather than 
purely Marxist phenomenology, and although the relationship 
between Marxist and Leninist doctrine is close, they are 
not identical. In any case, the Marxist pedigree of 
Leninism is certainly beyond the scope of this sub-thesis. 
Nevertheless, Marx’s doctrine of the unity of theory and 
practice does support the general observation that 
political interests derive from philosophical values, 
especially in the case of Marxist-Leninist politics. 
Detailed consideration of this doctrine may be found in 
Lewis, op.cit., and Bottomore, op.cit.
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the success of a power political interest can only be achieved 
through the negation of the doctrinal principle from which 
that power political interest is itself derived. This is the 
essential dynamic of competition between doctrinal and 
political interests in Communist decision-making.
PART THREE
THE HISTORY OF MARXIST-LENINIST ACTION
CHAPTER V
The Structure of Change in International Communism.
The Structure of Change in International Communism.
It is now possible to make certain, tentative, propositions 
about the structure of theoretical and political change in 
international Communism. The preceding analyses suggest that 
Communist policy is shaped by competition between the 
different political and ideological interests which derive 
from the competing requirements of discipline and diversity 
inherent in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This competition is 
resolved through the interpretation and application of 
objective conditions to the philosophical goals of Marxism- 
Leninism. Thus, the priority apportioned to any particular 
political, ideological or theoretical interest depends on the 
prevailing interpretation of objective conditions.
This chapter will consider whether such a critique of 
Communist policy formation constitutes a sustainable 
proposition about the general process of theoretical and 
political change in international Communism. It will then 
proceed to test this general proposition against the broader 
historical experience of international Communism.
The whole edifice of Marxist-Leninist phenomenology rests on a 
particular series of doctrinal categories. Without delving 
too deeply into semantics, it is important to distinguish 
clearly the three categories or levels of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. The only defining, phi 1osophic proposition about 
Communism is belief in class conflict as the basis of all 
ethical systems, and a concomitant commitment to dialectical 
progress. Indeed, Lenin never defined the ultimate Communist
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society, he merely asserted "that it has its origin in
capitalism, that it develops historically from capitalism,
that it is the result of the action of a social force to which
1
capitalism has given birth”. The next level of doctrine 
concerns theoretica 1 systems, such as Lenin’s theory of 
Bolshevik revolution, which assist the social action from 
which Communism must develop. The ideo1ogica 1 level of 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine relates to specific political and 
educational programmes designed to achieve theoretical goals.
Thus, while conflict between the needs of discipline and 
diversity, short-term political and long-term theoretical 
interests are all resolved in terms of the philosophical 
objectives of Communism - these objectives do not provide 
dogmatic guidance for policy formulation. The Marxist- 
Leninist policy-maker is in the intellectual position of the 
Protestant rather than the Catholic. The range of theoretical 
and ideological programmes consistent with the defining 
philosophy are extremely broad. Ultimately, the basis of 
revisionism can only be assessed within this highly 
interpretative and diverse political culture.
The absence of dogma and the pre-eminence of interpretation 
means that clear-cut statements about legitimacy are only 
relatively sustainable. This obviously reinforces the process 
of doctrinal diversification. But it also serves to justify 
the Stalinist concern with international discipline and
1. Lenin, State and Revolution, op.cit., p. 64.
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solidarity. The enormous scope for diversity carries with it 
a corresponding danger of error. This would appear to suggest 
that the twin tendencies of discipline and diversity - 
identified in the above case studies - do, indeed, represent 
general characteristics of Marxist-Leninist phenomenology.
This is prima facie evidence that the experience of the above 
case studies does provide the basis for a general statement 
about the process of theoretical and political change in the 
international Communist movement.
The basic historical contention of this sub-thesis is that 
international Communism has passed through two distinct eras 
distinguished by the ascendancy of the different theoretical 
values of discipline and diversity. This categorization 
depends on the degree to which the various Parties’ objectives 
and imperatives are based on similar interpretations of 
objective conditions. In other words, when the various 
Parties agree on a common interpretation of objective 
conditions discipline can prevail without doctrinal 
controversy, but when they do not agree on these fundamental 
conditions doctrinal diversity is most likely to develop.
The history of international discipline under Stalin has
2
already been considered in detail. Likewise, the decline of
Sino-Soviet consensus on the interpretation of Communist
3
priorities was considered ab initio. It is now appropriate
2. See Chapter II, above, pp. 31-46.
3. See Chapter III, above, pp. 48-66.
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to consider the imperatives of Communist policy formulation 
after the Sino-Soviet dispute. The analysis will concentrate 
on events between 1963 and 1976.
The unity of world Communism was first broken in June 1948,
when Stalin expelled Tito’s League of Communists from the
Cominform. But this was a "decision of the Soviet leadership
to excommunicate, not a decision by the Yugoslav party to 
4
secede". It represented the exercise of Soviet authority
over membership of the movement, rather than a challenge to
the nature of the movement itself. It was the Sino-Soviet
dispute which is generally accepted as the major turning point
in the unity of the movement. After 1963 the movement
polarized, split and then began to fragment:
Thus in 1977 the words "world communist movement” were 
bound to cover at least three political phenomena: the
Soviet state and the communist parties outside Russia 
that proclaimed their devotion to Soviet policy; the 
Chinese state and the communist parties outside China 
that looked to the theory and practice of Mao Tse-tung 
as their model; and a miscellaneous collection of 
Trotskyist and other heretical groups professing 
themselves to be Marxist-Leninists. To these might 
possibly be added the Vietnamese state and groups outside 
Vietnam that took it as their model; and conceivably the 
same might be said of North Korea. 5
the common residue of ideology makes it possible to 
attempt a meaningful discussion of the activities of 
"communists" in world politics in the 1960s and 1970s; 
yet the notion that there was a single world communist 
movement in this period must be abandoned. 6
It is crucial to understand the exact nature of this new
diversity. It is particularly important to note that it was
4. Hugh Seton-Watson. The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends 
in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s. (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1978) p. 1.
5. Ibid.. p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 6.
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neither intrinsically anti-Soviet nor anti-diseip 1ine. The 
doctrine of theoretical diversity - preached more than 
practiced by Lenin - was unequivocally proclaimed as early as 
the 1957 Moscow Conference:
Marxism-Leninism calls for a creative application of the 
general principles of the socialist revolution and 
socialist construction depending on the concrete 
conditions of each country, and rejects mechanical 
imitation of the policies and tactics of the Communist 
Parties of other countries. Lenin repeatedly called 
attention to the necessity of correctly applying the 
basic principles of communism, in keeping with the 
specific features of the nation, of the national state 
concerned. Disregard of national pecularities by the 
proletarian party inevitably leads to its divorce from 
reality, from the masses and is bound to prejudice the 
cause of socialism and conversely, exaggeration of the 
role of these pecularities or departure, under the 
pretext of national pecularities, from the universal 
Marxist-Leninist truth on the socialist revolution and 
socialist construction is just as harmful to the 
socialist cause. 7
This statement highlights the central dilemma of international 
Communism during and after the Sino-Soviet dispute. All 
parties accepted the need for national theoretical and 
ideological development, but they also accepted the danger of 
national pecularities perverting the ”universal Marxist- 
Leninist truth”. Each party accepted principles which could 
serve both to justify and condemn actions such as the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus, the issues of discipline and 
diversity were not merely theoretical screens for Soviet 
geopolitical ambition. They provoked real questions of policy 
for all Marxist-Leninist parties.
It is as well to remember that Marxist-Leninist doctrine is 
extremely objectivist and unsentimental, inherently illiberal
7. 1957 Moscow Statement, op.cit., p. 52.
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a n d  r e m o t e  f r o m  m a j o r i t y  r u l e .  I t  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  L e n i n i s t  
n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  i s  i n c a p a b l e  o f  r e a l i z i n g  i t s  own 
b e s t  i n t e r e s t .  T h i s  d o c t r i n e  i s  s h a r e d  b y  a l l  M a r x i s t -  
L e n i n i s t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  E u r o c o m m u n i s t s  who s e e k  t o  
t r a n s f o r m  s o c i e t y  b y  p e a c e f u l  m e a n s .  T h e  r e f o r m i s m  o f  t h e  
F r e n c h  a n d  I t a l i a n  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t i e s  m u s t  n o t  b e  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  
l i b e r a l  p l u r a l i s m .  T h e s e  f o r m s  o f  M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  may  u s e  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  b o u r g e o i s  d e m o c r a c y ,  b u t  t h e y  r e m a i n  
o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  i t  s e r v e s .  And w h i l e  t h e y  
r e j e c t  t h e  v i o l e n t  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  c l a s s  c o n f l i c t ,  t h e y  a c c e p t  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r e v i s i o n i s m  a n d  t h e  n e e d  t o  n e g a t e  i t s  
i n f l u e n c e .  T h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  r e v i s i o n i s m  i s  a  n e c e s s a r y  t a s k  
o f  a n y  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y ,  d i s p u t e  o n l y  e x i s t s  a s  t o  t h e  f o r m  o f  
s u p p r e s s i o n  -  t h e  S o v i e t s  u s e  f o r c e ,  t h e  I t a l i a n s  e d u c a t i o n .
T h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  W e s t  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t i e s  t o  t h e
i n v a s i o n  o f  C z e c h o s l o v a k i a  i s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  t h i s  c o n t i n u i n g
t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  d i v e r s i t y .  T h e  C o m m u n i s t
P a r t i e s  o f  L u x e m b o u r g ,  W e s t  G e r m a n y  a n d  P o r t u g a l  s u p p o r t e d  
8
t h e  i n v a s i o n .  T h e  o t h e r  l e g a l  P a r t i e s  p u b l i c l y  d e p l o r e d  i t ,
a l t h o u g h  T a n n a h i l l  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  r e a c t i o n  s t e m m e d  l a r g e l y
f r o m  a  n e e d  t o  c o n t a i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  i n v a s i o n ’ s 
9
u n p o p u l a r i t y .  I t  i s  p e r t i n e n t  t h a t  a  l a r g e  g r o u p  i n  t h e
10
F r e n c h  p a r t y  r e m a i n e d  l o y a l  t o  t h e  CPSU.  T h e  I t a l i a n s
11
d e p l o r e d  t h e  a c t i o n  a s  u n j u s t i f i e d ,  n o t  u n a c c e p t a b l e  -  o n l y
8 .  R.  N e a l  T a n n a h i l l .  T h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t i e s  o f  W e s t e r n  
E u r o p e ;  A C o m p a r a t i v e  S t u d y . ( W e s t p o r t ;  G r e e n w o o d  P r e s s ,  
1 9 7 8 )  p .  5 7 - 5 8 .
9 .  I b i d . , p .  9 3 .
1 0 .  I b i d . , p .  6 7 .
.. , p .  7 2 .11 . I b i d
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later did they adopt the stronger, more autonomist, notion
12
that "Sovereignty is an inalienable right”.
The international movement reacted to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia with remarkable ambivalence; the solidarity of 
the Stalinist era was replaced with multifarious equivocation. 
But the Soviet invasion was not condemned as anathema to the 
theory or practice of Marxism-Leninism. The principle behind 
the invasion was established by the 1957 Moscow Conference.
As will be seen below, when the invasion was debated at the 
1969 Moscow Conference, the movement only questioned its 
violence and need, not the morality of crushing revisionism.
Inter-party relations were now political, rather than 
hierarchical. But the reaction to the invasion serves to 
highlight the continued prestige of the Soviet Union after the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese were only supported by 
Albania and small factions. None of the major West European 
Communist parties supported the Chinese line. A fact which 
enabled them to extract greater autonomy for themselves in the 
international movement.
In exchange for general support of Soviet positions and 
condemnation of the Chinese, Moscow has been willing to 
accept a greater independence from the Western parties.
At the same time, the Western European parties (the more 
independent ones, at least) are careful not to go too far 
in their support of Moscow’s position. The last thing 
they want is a complete victory for the Soviets that 
would restore Russian hegemony in the international 
movement and thus threaten their independence. 13
12. L ’Unite. 15 January 1971. Cited in Ibid., pp. 72-73.
13. Ibid., p. 101.
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The political and theoretical landscape of the international 
movement was now dominated by the competition between the 
political and theoretical interests of discipline and 
diversity - unity and independence.
The entire history of the international movement has been 
shaped by this tension between discipline and diversity.
Indeed, it can be divided into the periods of Stalinist 
discipline and post-Sta1 inist diversity. But the analysis of 
the Czechoslovak invasion suggests that this duality also 
influences the policy options of the decentralized period of 
theoretical and political diversity after the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. The following analysis will consider this phenomenon 
through an examination of the major international Communist 
conferences which have taken place since the dispute.
The Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties of Europe 
which took place at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, on 24, 25
and 26 April 1967 was the largest such meeting since the 
Moscow Conference of 1960. The theme of the Conference was 
European security, and its proceedings highlighted the tension 
within the movement between the concerns of discipline and 
unity, diversity and independence. This tension was 
immediately revealed in the refusal of certain parties even to 
attend the Conference. It was in response to this absenteeism 
that Walter Ulbricht identified the major issue, not only of
the Conference, but of contemporary Communism:
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Is it a restriction of the sovereignty and autonomy of a 
party if, as in the case of our conference, a free 
exchange of views takes place to solve common problems? 
The fundamental principle of ’Workers of the World Unite! 
proceeds from the premise that every party bears a 
responsibility to the entire communist movement. 14
Indeed, the abiding question in international Communism over
the next decade was the content and limits of the
responsibility the ’’entire communist movement” had to uphold
the movement’s fundamental principles in the face of
individual party sovereignty and autonomy.
The keynote address by Leonid Brezhnev outlined the connection
between independence, security and unity. He praised the
diversity of the fraternal parties in ’’striving to make more
effective use of the inherent possibilities of socialism and
acquire fuller mastery of the laws of development of the
15
socialist economy” . He then proceeded to assess the security
situation, ’’European security is a key condition for
16
averting a world nuclear conflict”, and ”Facts show that the
present war threat from German imperialism is very real 
17
indeed.” This led him to conclude that unity within the 
international movement was required in order to meet the 
contemporary threat from imperialism, ’’Communists are active 
supporters of the unity of action of all democratic and
14. Walter Ulbricht. ’’Address to the Conference of Communist
and Workers’ Parties of Europe: 24-26 April 1967”. Cited 
in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1968.
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969). p. 755.
15. Leonid Brezhnev. ’’Address to the Conference of Communist 
and Workers’ Parties of Europe: 24-26 April 1967”. 
Reprinted in Yearbook 1968, Ibid., p. 1035.
16. Ibid., p. 1036.
17. Ibid., p. 1037.
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p e a c e - l o v i n g  f o r c e s .  B u t  t h i s  c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  o n l y  i f  we
18
o u r s e l v e s  s e t  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  u n i t y  i n  t h o u g h t  a n d  a c t i o n . ”
I t  i s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  a c c e p t e d  t h e
S o v i e t  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  s e c u r i t y  s i t u a t i o n  a n d
t h e  d e m a n d  i t  c r e a t e d  f o r  u n i t y  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e  w i t h i n  t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o v e m e n t .  T h e y  d i d  s o  a f t e r  S t a l i n ,  a f t e r  t h e
S i n o - S o v i e t  d i s p u t e ,  a f t e r  K h r u s h c h e v  a n d  b e f o r e  t h e  i n v a s i o n
o f  C z e c h o s l o v a k i a .  T h i s  p e r i o d  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  p e a k  i n  t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  f r a t e r n a l  p a r t i e s .  T h i s  f a c t  s t r o n g l y
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  S t a t e m e n t  a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t e d
t h e  u n a d u l t e r a t e d  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s :
E a c h  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y ,  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  
w h i c h  i t  w o r k s ,  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  a n d  
t h e  w o r k i n g  p e o p l e  o f  i t s  c o u n t r y ,  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  i n  
g e n e r a l .  At  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  e a c h  p a r t y  i s  a w a r e  o f  i t s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s a f e g u a r d i n g  p e a c e ,  f o r  
f o r m i n g  n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  c o n f o r m i n g  t o  t h e  
n e e d s  o f  o u r  t i m e .
T h i s  s e n s e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  o f  u s ,  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s  o f  E u r o p e ,  t h a t  we p o o l  o u r  e f f o r t s  f o r  
t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s .  T h e  s t r o n g e r  t h e  u n i t y  
a n d  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  W o r k e r s *  p a r t i e s  i n  
E u r o p e  a n d  a l l  o v e r  t h e  w o r l d ,  t h e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  o u r  
s t r u g g 1e . 19
T h u s ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  u n i t y ,  
d i v e r s i t y  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  w e r e  a c c e p t e d  a s  i m p o r t a n t  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s ,  a n d  t h e y  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  p a r t i e s *  a p p r o a c h  t o  
t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  s e c u r i t y  i n  1 9 6 7 .  T h e s e  w e r e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
i m p e r a t i v e s  w h i c h  l o s t  n o  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  
i n v a s i o n  o f  C z e c h o s l o v a k i a .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e
1 8 .  I b i d . , p .  1 0 4 1 .
1 9 .  " F o r  P e a c e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  i n  E u r o p e :  S t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  
C o n f e r e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  W o r k e r s *  P a r t i e s  o f  E u r o p e :  
2 4 - 2 6  A p r i l  1 9 6 7 ” . R e p r i n t e d  i n  Y e a r b o o k  1 9 6 8 ,  I b i d . . 
p .  1 0 4 5 .
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Sino-Soviet dispute and the invasion of Czechoslovakia upon 
the nature of party autonomy and international obligations 
were the primary issues discussed at the International 
Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow 
from 5-17 June 1969. The debate centered on the appropriate 
policy balance between independence and unity.
The Italian and Rumanian parties led in the defence of party
autonomy and national sovereignty. The Italian leader, Enrico
Berlinguer, claimed that it was essential ”to respect fully
the principles of the equality and sovereignty of every
people” because ’’international ism cannot be counterposed
20
against these principles”. The Rumanian leader, Nicolae
Ceausescu, stressed that ”the principle of internationalism
should not be invoked on any account to justify non-observance
of the other principles, to justify interference of any kind
in the internal affairs of a socialist country or fraternal 
21
Party”. These positions were based on the principle of
doctrinal diversification. Berlinguer emphasized his Party’s
rejection of ”the thesis that a single model of socialist
22
society suitable for all situations can exist”, and Ceausescu 
stated that only the party militants of a particular country 
could know the facts of its socio-political life and how to
20. Enrico Berlinguer. ’’Address to the International Meeting
of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow: 5-17 June 1969.” 
Cited in Yearbook of International Communist Affairs: 1970.
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971) p. 793.
21. Nicolae Ceausescu. ’’Address to the International Meeting
of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow: 5-17 June
1969.” Cited in Yearbook 1970, Ibid..
22. Berlinguer, op.cit.
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act "in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism" in solving their 
23
problems.
This position was not based on nationalist concepts of 
sovereignty, but on the Leninist idea that Communism can only 
be achieved by applying theoretical systems and ideological 
programmes appropriate to the particular objective conditions 
of host societies. It was perfectly legitimate in terms of 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. But so too was the position of the 
conservative parties, led by the CPSU, which denied the 
intrinsic importance of national frontiers and emphasized the 
importance of proletarian internationalism. These two 
positions were enshrined in the Final Statement of the 1969 
Conference:
The participants in the Meeting are convinced that the 
effectiveness of each Communist Party’s policy depends on 
its successes in its own country, on the successes of 
other fraternal Parties and on the extent of their 
co-operation. Each Communist Party is responsible for its 
activity to its own working class and people and at the 
same time, to the international working class. The 
national and international responsibilities of each 
Communist and Workers’ Party are indivisible. Marxist- 
Leninists are both patriots and internationalists; they 
reject both national narrow-mindedness and the negation or 
underestimation of national interests, and the striving 
for hegemony. At the same time, the Communist Parties - 
the Parties of the working class and all working people - 
are the standardbearers of genuine national interests 
unlike the reactionary classes, which betray these 
interests. The winning of power by the working class and 
its allies is the greatest contribution which a Communist 
Party fighting under capitalist conditions can make to the 
cause of socialism and proletarian internationalism. 24
23. Ceausescu, op.cit.
24. "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle against
Imperialism and United Action of Communist and Workers’ 
Parties and all Anti-imperia1ist Forces: The Final
Statement of the International Meeting of Communist and 
Workers’ Parties, Moscow: 17 June 1969". Reprinted in
Yearbook 1970, Ibid., p. 819. Italics added.
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N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  e m p h a s i s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o v e m e n t  wa s
i n c r e a s i n g l y  b e i n g  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d
d o c t r i n a l  d i v e r s i t y .  T h i s  e m e r g i n g  ” a u t o n o m i s t ” t e n d e n c y
r e a c h e d  a  h i g h  p o i n t  a t  t h e  l a s t  m a j o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i s t
c o n f e r e n c e ,  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  W o r k e r s ’ P a r t i e s
o f  E u r o p e  h e l d  i n  E a s t  B e r l i n  o n  2 9  a n d  3 0  J u n e  1 9 7 6 .  T h i s
e m p h a s i s  wa s  e v e n  a c c e p t e d  b y  B r e z h n e v :  ’’E v e r y  C o m m u n i s t  p a r t y
i s  . . .  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t s  a c t i o n s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  b e f o r e  t h e
w o r k i n g  p e o p l e  o f  i t s  own c o u n t r y ,  w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  i t
25
e x p r e s s e s  a n d  d e f e n d s ” . B u t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  u n i t y  a n d  
d i s c i p l i n e  -  now s y m b o l i z e d  b y  t h e  t e r m  ’ p r o l e t a r i a n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ’ r e m a i n e d  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  
o u t  1o o k :
Our  P a r t y ,  b e i n g  l o y a l  t o  t h e  g r e a t  i d e a s  o f  p r o l e t a r i a n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  h a s  n e v e r  s e p a r a t e d  t h e  d e s t i n i e s  o f  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  f r o m  t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E u r o p e  
a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  26
T h e  a u t o n o m i s t  l e a d e r s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  d o c t r i n a l
b e n e f i t s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  d o c t r i n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d
d i v e r s i t y .  B u t  t h e y  a c k n o w l e d g e d ,  a l b e i t  v a g u e l y  o r  e v e n  o n l y
i m p l i c i t l y ,  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  s o l i d a r i t y ,
u n i t y  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e .  T i t o  e n d o r s e d  t h e  M a r x i s t  p o s t u l a t e
2 7
t h a t  ’’ c l a s s  s t r u g g l e  i s  w a g e d  o n  a  w o r l d - w i d e  s c a l e ” .
C e a u s e s c u  s t a t e d  t h a t  ’’b e t w e e n  n a t i o n a l  d u t i e s  a n d  t h o s e  
p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o l i d a r i t y  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t
2 5 .  L e o n i d  B r e z h n e v .  ’’A d d r e s s  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t
a n d  W o r k e r s ’ P a r t i e s  o f  E u r o p e ,  E a s t  B e r l i n :  2 9 - 3 0  J u n e  
1 9 7 6 ” . C i t e d  i n  Y e a r b o o k  o n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i s t  
A f f a i r s :  1 9 7 7 . ( S t a n f o r d :  H o o v e r  I n s t i t u t i o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 7 )
p .  5 7 4 .
2 6 .  I b i d .
2 7 .  J o s i p  T i t o .  ’’A d d r e s s  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  
W o r k e r s ’ P a r t i e s  o f  E u r o p e ,  E a s t  B e r l i n :  2 9 - 3 0  J u n e  1 9 7 6 ” . 
C i t e d  i n  Y e a r b o o k  1 9 7 7 ,  I b i d . . p .  5 7 5 .
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parties there is complete dialectical unity”, and whatever 
the nature of that "complete dialectical unity” at least he 
acknowledged the existence of international duties.
The French and Italian leaders, Ber1inguer and Marchais,
adopted extreme autonomous positions. Indeed, Marchais stated
that "as far as we are concerned conferences such as this no
29
longer meet the requirements of our times”. Yet they did not 
reject that part of the unsigned "Final Document” which 
stated:
The Communist and Workers’ Parties of European countries 
... will develop their internationalist, comradely and 
voluntary cooperation and solidarity on the basis of the 
great ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, strictly adhering 
to the principles of equality and sovereign independence 
of each Party, non-interference in internal affairs, and 
respect for their free choice of different roads in the 
struggle for social change of a progressive nature and 
for socialism. 30
Thus, the dual theoretical interests of discipline and 
diversity can be seen to have caused continuous policy 
differences throughout the post-dispute era. The various
28. Nicolae Ceausescu. "Address to the Conference of Communist 
and Workers’ Parties of Europe, East Berlin: 29-30 June 
1976”. Cited in Yearbook 1977, Ibid.
29. Georges Marchais. "Address to the Conference of Communist 
and Workers’ Parties of Europe, East Berlin: 29-30 June 
1976”. Cited in Yearbook 1977, Ibid., p. 576.
30. "Final Document of the Conference of Communist and 
Workers’ Parties of Europe, East Berlin: 29-30 June 1976”. 
Cited in Yearbook 1977, Ibid., p. 577. It is worth noting 
that the term "proletarian internationalism” - used by 
Brezhnev in his address to the Conference - has now been 
replaced by the words "internationalist, comradely and 
voluntary cooperation and solidarity”. This implied a 
looser relationship than the Soviet formulation which had 
been used to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This 
may be seen as further evidence of the move toward 
independence and doctrinal diversity.
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political and theoretical interests of the period stemmed from 
the different emphasis particular parties placed on these 
inherent doctrinal concerns.
The Eurocommunists and autonomists were concerned with policy 
independence and non-intervention. These interests stemmed 
from a particular interpretation of objective conditions which 
placed a high premium on reformist, collaborationist, non­
violent and educational ideological programmes. These 
programmes and the objective conditions upon which they were 
based differed from those in other societies. These Parties, 
therefore, benefited by an international policy which 
emphasized diversity and independence.
The political and theoretical interests of the CPSU were 
concerned with security problems relating to the systemic 
struggle with the United States. They were concerned to 
emphasize unity, solidarity and discipline within the 
international movement, and not necessarily out of any 
sinister neo-Stalinist ambitions. The objective conditions of 
the Soviet Union really were dominated by the contest with the 
United States - it is only reasonable that this should produce 
political and theoretical interests different to those of the 
Eurocommunist Parties.
The point is that all major policy documents produced by the 
international Communist movement since 1957 assert the dual 
theoretical interests of discipline and diversity. The
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political debates during the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Conferences, 
the European Conferences at Karlovy Vary in 1967 and East 
Berlin in 1976, and the last major international conference at 
Moscow in 1969 were dominated by these dual interests. It has 
also been seen, throughout the sub-thesis, that the 
theoretical interests emphasized by Communist parties are 
derived from their particular interpretation of the 
theoretical and ideological impact of the objective conditions 
of the society in which they operate.
Thus, it may be stated that the process of theoretical and 
political change in the international Communist movement is 
the result of competition between the different theoretical 
and political interests which arise from the separate and 
competing requirements of discipline and diversity inherent in 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This competition is resolved - in 
so far as resolution means the adoption of a particular policy 
option - on the basis of political priorities established by 
the prevailing interpretation of objective conditions.
Change in the international Communist movement is constrained
by (or conditioned by) the requirement to be presentable as
consistent with the theoretical postulates of Marxism-
Leninism. During periods when the interests of discipline are
in the ascendancy - when the objective conditions of a
majority of Communist Parties dictate the pursuit of a unified
and disciplined policy approach (or they interpret that
31. The 1960 Conference was not considered in this Chapter, 
as it explicitly confirmed the 1957 Moscow Declaration.
31
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objective conditions dictate such a policy approach) - the 
international Communist movement operates as a single 
political organization. But when the interest in doctrinal 
application, development and diversity is ascendant the 
movement is likely to be extremely factious and decentralized. 
These positions are not inherently irreconcilable, they merely 
represent degrees of political and theoretical priority. The 
threat of bourgeois violence or revision - such as before and 
during the Second World War - constitutes objective conditions 
which call for international discipline. In the absence of 
such threat, Leninist doctrine can be experimented with and 
applied to the different objective conditions of various 
societies. This is, after all, the primary responsibility of 
the Leninist party - to discover the form of Communism 
appropriate to society.
The most important structural characteristic of Marxism- 
Leninism revealed by the foregoing analyses relates to the 
interpretative role of the Marxist-Leninist party. The entire 
structure of Marxist-Leninist action stems from the official 
interpretation of objective conditions. This primary decision 
of the party leadership establishes the substance of the 
organization’s theoretical systems and ideological programmes. 
It dictates the orientation of doctrinal effort, whether 
towards discipline or development. This policy structure 
determines the theoretical, ideological and political 
priorities by which the political relations of the
organization are actually conducted.
CONCLUSION
T h e o r y ,  P o l i t i c s  a n d  C h a n g e  i n  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i s t  M o v e m e n t .
Theory, Politics and Change in the International Communist 
Movement.
The international Communist movement exists as an expression
1
of Marxist-Leninist political philosophy. The theoretical and 
ideological imperatives of this philosophy establish the 
criteria for membership in the movement. They motivate, 
direct and control the political behaviour of the movement and 
its constituent members. It follows that the process of 
theoretical and political change within the international 
Communist movement is controlled by the philosophical 
imperatives of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, in order to explain 
the history of the international Communist movement it is 
essential to understand the structure of Marxist-Leninist 
phi1osophy.
The doctrines of Marxism-Leninism are dominated by the 
imperatives of Leninist class analysis and dialectical 
materialism. The most important characteristics of this 
philosophical framework is the simultaneous requirement it 
creates for doctrinal discipline and doctrinal development.
1. Acceptance of the Leninist variant of Marxism was a
pre-condition for membership of the Comintern (see, Lenin, 
Left-wing Communism, op.cit., and Terms of Admission into 
the Communist International, op.cit.); and in disputes 
within the movement it it still standard practice for 
disputants to accuse each other of violating Marxist- 
Leninist norms. The Marxisms of Luka^S, Gramsci, Marcuse and 
the recent Eurocommunists, see S. Carrillo, Eurocommunism 
and the State. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), argue 
either continuity with Marx and Lenin or the outdatedness 
of some postulates of one or the other, without attacking 
their general corpus of ideas. ’’Revisionists" such as 
Khrushchev argued that Lenin or Marx would have themselves 
come to different conclusions in different circumstances, 
and stress the dynamic rather than dogmatic nature of their 
thinking. It is still, therefore, axiomatic that ’’the 
international Communist movement” is an expression of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the ethical values it 
prescribes, rather than of any conceivable alternative 
thereto.
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Doctrinal discipline is required because socialist ideology is 
considered vulnerable due to the alleged inability of the 
proletariat to develop an indigenous socialist consciousness. 
This creates a strong impulse toward doctrinal uniformity.
The impulse to doctrinal diversity stems from the dialectical 
need for theoretical and ideological programmes to reflect 
changing objective conditions. This creates a need for 
theoretical and ideological experiment. Thus, the imperatives 
of Leninist class analysis and dialectical materialism demand 
both discipline and diversity, unity and independence.
These doctrinal impulses are not inherently irreconcilable, as 
they serve different phenomenological purposes. The impulse 
to discipline relates to the integrity of doctrine, diversity 
relates to the relevance of doctrine. Nevertheless, these 
separate concerns may give rise to conflicting ideological and 
political interests unless they are balanced within an agreed 
interpretation of objective conditions.
This leads to the central political problem of the 
international Communist movement - the interpretation of 
objective conditions. The only immutable truth of Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine is that Communism will develop from the 
social forces generated by the repressive nature of capitalist 
class structure. This is the basic fact of Marxist class 
analysis and dialectical materialism, and all other doctrinal 
positions and policies are derivative of this single truth.
The fundamental task of the Communist Party is to develop
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theoretical and ideological programmes appropriate to the 
objective conditions of society. This involves distinguishing 
legitimate theoretical revisions, based on objective 
conditions, from revisions which constitute the assertion of 
bourgeois ideology. The revision of doctrine is a highly 
interpretative and constant task in dynamic societies.
Thus, the common philosophical objectives of the international 
movement do not ensure universally agreed theoretical and 
ideological programmes. Nor are the philosophical objectives 
of the international Communist movement universally accepted 
within the international political system. These conflicts 
subject the international movement to competitive political 
relations. First, disputes over theoretical and ideological 
programmes within the movement give rise to internal political 
competition - factionalism. Secondly, the philosophical 
objectives of the movement must be defended against the power 
political interests of non-Communists.
2
The mechanism of competitive power politics determines 
capacity to implement policy. It simply involves the 
comparison of resources and priority - commitment, strength. 
This establishes which policy interests can withstand the 
claims of other policy interests upon resources. The actual 
forum of competition may be intellectual debate, compromise 
and trade-off, military pressure or invasion. But, whereas 
competitive or power politics defines success only in terms
2. See definition of terms, Introduction, p. 10, above.
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of policy triumph, the Marxist-Leninist defines success in 
terms of other ethical values. Thus, the power political 
interests of Communist states, and factions, tend to be the 
practical, policy manifestations of ideological, theoretical 
and philosophical interests.
These are the major factors in the historical analysis of the 
international Communist movement. They provide the necessary 
components for a general statement on the process of 
theoretical and political change in the international 
Communist movement.
The imperatives of Communist decision-making may be listed as 
follows. In the first instance, a theoretical and ideological 
strategy must be devised which will best facilitate the 
development of Communism. This process involves assessment of 
the objective conditions of the host society. It also 
involves an assessment of international conditions which is a 
major concern in establishing the relative weight given to the 
interests of discipline and diversity. This is an enormous 
interpretative and analytica 1 task: it involves assessment of
economic, social, cultural and ethnic conditions, not only in 
the host society, but in the world at large.
This is the point in the policy process at which theoretical 
and ideological interests may be compromised in order to 
secure or advance the overall objectives of Communism. The 
Communist Party may find it useful to suppress particular
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aspects of a doctrinal programme in order to enter into 
political coalition, gain military hardware, or secure any 
number of material or political benefits. But the purpose of 
Marxist-Leninist policy remains attainment of Communism.
The philosophical integrity of political action is maintained
by the priority structure established by the philosophical
objectives of Communism. All action taken by Communist states
or parties is conditioned by the need to be, or at the very
least to appear to be, consistent with their stated
philosophical objectives. Thus, the limits of compromise are
reached when the doctrinal benefit of a political compromise
3
is actually negated by the process of compromise.
The flexibility of this structure lies in the graduated status 
of doctrinal benefit. A power political compromise might 
negate an ideological benefit, but be justified by an 
associated theoretical benefit, or negate a theoretical 
benefit but be justified by an associated philosophical 
benefit. This process occurs at all levels of Communist 
decision-making from foreign policy to the interpretation of 
objective conditions. It ensures that flexibility and 
political compromise are ultimately controlled by the 
philosophical objectives of Marxism-Leninism.
3. Of course, the objectives which actually motivate
political action are not always those claimed to have 
done so. The point to be made, however, is that a 
consistent Marxist-Leninist, acting as a Marxist- 
Leninist, must act on the basis of philosophical 
objectives.
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The process of change in the international Communist 
movement is dominated by the structure of Marx i st-Leninist 
philosophy. In the first instance, the actions which give 
rise to change are formulated on the basis of policy 
guidelines - doctrines - derived from the prevailing 
interpretation of objective conditions. The most 
significant policy consequence of this interpretation is 
the relative emphasis it apportions to the competing needs 
of doctrinal discipline and doctrinal diversity. This 
establishes the priority of specific ideological and 
theoretical interests and provides the policy-maker with a 
guide to the political, ideological and theoretical 
interests which may or may not be compromised in the 
process of political competition. It is this system of 
doctrinal priorities which determines the nature of actual 
decisions, and which regulates the process of decision at 
all levels of Marxist-Leninist policy formulation.
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